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OVERRULING PRECEDENT: "A DERELICT
IN THE STREAM OF THE LAW"
Michael H. LeRoy*
ABSTRACT
Will the Supreme Court overrule Hoffman Plastic Compounds v.
N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002), its precedent that treats unlawful alien
workers as criminals and denies them backpay for a violation of a labor
law? More generally, what are the statistical indicators of a precedent that
the Supreme Court overrules-and how well does Hoffman Plastic fit that
profile? To answer these research questions, I analyze two unique
databases-128 federal and state rulings from 2002-2012 that involved
Hoffman Plastic's remedy issue, and a sample of 154 Supreme Court pair-
ings of an overruled precedent, and the decision that explicitly rejected it.
My study draws on a metaphor that the Supreme Court uses when they
view a precedent as "a derelict in the stream of the law"-a reference to a
stranded shipwreck. I adapt a concept from the science of rivers that com-
pares sudden changes in a river's course to a process for changing the
stream of the Court's precedents. The theory posits that closely decided
cases are the most likely to be "derelicts." Hoffman Plastic easily meets this
threshold with its 5-4 ruling. While a close vote hardly means that a prece-
dent will be overruled, the Supreme Court database shows that a case de-
cided by one vote is more likely than others to be overruled.
A precedent can be overruled when adverse lower court rulings deposit
downstream from the lead case. There is empirical evidence of this deposi-
tion process for Hoffman Plastic. Between 2002 and 2012, KeyCite classi-
fied 64 cases as negative authority for this precedent. Hoffman Plastic
compares, therefore, to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), a case
that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled, and Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987), expressly overruled by the Court. Five federal circuit
courts are part of the accumulation of negative precedent downstream from
Hoffman Plastic.
Statistical evidence from the Hoffman Plastic database bolsters these
KeyCite comparisons. Among federal district courts, 68.9% of the cases
said that their facts or legal circumstances were distinguishable from Hoff-
man Plastic, and only 13.3% of federal opinions and 25% of state opinions
cited this precedent as positive authority. The possibility that Hoffman
Plastic will be overruled is further suggested by the time analysis of Su-
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preme Court precedents. Compared to these cases, Hoffman Plastic is still
early in the timeline. An overruled precedent lasts, on average, 19.5 years;
and the regression equation in this study predicts that 13.1 years pass
before the Court overrules "derelicts" that were decided by one vote. Hoff-
man Plastic was decided only 11 years ago. A Senate bill to reform immi-
gration law, which legitimizes employment of current unlawful aliens, may
further erode judicial support for Hoffman Plastic.
These findings do not mean that the overruling of Hoffman Plastic is
imminent or inevitable. This study suggests that a deposition of down-
stream cases correlates with overruling-but it does not prove that adverse
lower court rulings cause the Court to overrule itself Justices also manage
bad precedents by marginalizing or ignoring them. This study shows, how-
ever, that when the Court overrules a precedent, this tends to happen (1)
within 20 years of the ruling, and (2) in cases that are decided by a one-vote
margin. Hoffman Plastic has these two "overruling" traits. Hopefully, a
richer model will analyze more variables associated with the overruling of
precedents. In time, it may be possible to predict the likelihood that a prece-
dent will be overruled, much like scientific models estimate the probability
of natural cataclysms.
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"If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
"Under law of the case doctrine, as now most commonly understood, it
is not improper for a court to depart from a prior holding if convinced that
it is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice."
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 n.8 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. CONTEXT FOR THE RESEARCH QUESTIONWILL the Supreme Court overrule its precedent in Hoffman
Plastic Compounds v. N.L.R.B.1 that treats unlawful alien
workers as criminals and denies them backpay for a violation
of a labor law? More generally, what are the statistical indicators of a
precedent that the Supreme Court overrules-and how well does Hoff-
man Plastic fit that profile? To answer these research questions, my study
uses two unique databases-128 federal and state rulings from 2002-2012
that involved the remedy issue in Hoffman Plastic, and a separate sample
of 154 Supreme Court pairs of an overruled precedent and the decision
that explicitly rejected it.
But first, some background and context are helpful. Continuity for le-
gal precedent is important because it promotes order and stability.2 But
precedents cannot live forever. Some are simply wrong. Others become
1. 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
2. Stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent, and means "to stand by things decided."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). The Supreme Court has said that stare
decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal princi-
ples, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived in-
tegrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); see also
Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (stating that "no judicial
system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.
Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable" (citation
omitted)).
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unworkable or obsolete as society changes.3 Often, a dead precedent is
not overruled. Courts ignore it to the point of driving the opinion from
the stream of cited authority. But a few precedents end more dramati-
cally: when the Court explicitly overrules them. This kind of change in
precedent is the subject of my empirical study.
The overruling of precedent helps to channel social, political, and eco-
nomic change. When the Supreme Court considers the correctness, rele-
vance, or vitality of a precedent, it weighs several factors.4 Still, the Court
is loath to overrule its precedents. This is characteristically true of all
courts. Perhaps this is because judges see their precedents as part of na-
ture, or at least a natural ordering of human affairs. Interestingly, judges
frequently relate their reasoning to rivers and streams,5 wellsprings, 6 and
3. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) (citing the "unworkability"
principle). More generally, this idea reflects the adaptability of the law. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience."); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 899 (2007) ("Just as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater
experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibition on 'restraint[s] of trade' evolve to
meet the dynamics of present economic conditions." (alteration in original)).
4. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009) ("Beyond workability, the rele-
vant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiq-
uity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision
was well reasoned.").
5. State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), offers an elaborate stream metaphor that fits
the approach in this study:
The common law has not become petrified; it does not stand still. It contin-
ues in a state of flux. And, its ever present fluidity enables it to meet and
adjust itself to shifting conditions and new demands. It has been described as
a leisurely stream that has not ceased to flow gently and continuously in its
proper channel, at times gradually and imperceptibly eroding a bit of the soil
from one of its banks and at other times getting rid of and depositing a bit of
silt.
Id. at 7. Federal courts have also invoked the "stream of precedent" analogy. See United
States v. Hamilton, Nos. 08-17026, 08-17160, 2009 WL 4787539, at *5 (11th Cir. Dec. 14,
2009) ("An unbroken stream of precedent in this Circuit holds that the uncorroborated
testimony of a co-conspirator or accomplice is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Consol. City of Jack-
sonville, 381 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) ("If an unreasonably high 'clearly established'
hurdle precludes many cases involving arguable constitutional violations from being
brought, then the stream of precedents recognizing certain governmental acts as constitu-
tional violations will dry up."); Allen v. Thomas, 161 F.3d 667, 673 (11th Cir. 1998) ("But
our formulation of the question is drawn from an unbroken stream of precedent spanning
more than a half-century, from the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst to our
own decision in Pardue v. Burton."); Craig v. Singletary, 127 F.3d 1030, 1044 (11th Cir.
1997) ("For the past forty years, an unbroken stream of precedent in this circuit has estab-
lished that the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator or accomplice is sufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d
1012, 1026 (11th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("By permitting the State of Alabama to
deny a public viewing of a controversial program, our court swims against a stream of
precedent and a philosophy that goes to the roots of one of our most cherished free-
doms."); Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127,151 (D.N.J. 1938) ("The condi-
tion of the authorities, then, boils down to this: The Davis Case dammed the flow of a
stream of precedents that had the earmark of giving a reasonable easement of assemblage
in public places.").
6. Courts have also used "wellspring" (source of a river) as a similar riparian meta-
phor. An early example praised "our common law" as "that profound wellspring of human
experience." In re Leland's Will, 160 N.Y.S. 372, 379 (N.Y. 1916); see also Victor v. State, 4
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watersheds.7
My study draws from a river analogy in several Supreme Court opin-
ions that view a precedent as "a derelict in the stream of law."8 In Flood
v. Kuhn,9 Justice Douglas referred to a shipwreck that is stuck in the
water to urge his brethren to overrule Federal Baseball Club of
Bainmore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,10 a pre-
cedent based on a discredited view of interstate commerce.
Two different approaches have been used to explain how Supreme
Court precedents are overruled. Some studies take a metaphorical ap-
proach, and equate this process to natural forces, including those associ-
A.3d 126, 135 (N.J. 2010) ("Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (citation omitted), which has been the essential wellspring for the rights granted to
persons with disabilities ever since."); Westar Energy, Inc. v. Wittig, 235 P.3d 515, 521
(Kan. 2010) ("[W~e turn to the reports from Delaware courts because Delaware is the
wellspring of Kansas corporate law"); In re Shaw, 204 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. 2006) ("What we
commonly know as an individual's right to privacy and right of association find their well-
spring in the so-called penumbras of the First Amendment."); Messersmith v. Mid-Century
Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("From this unspectacular
wellspring, a flood of precedents has poured forth."); People v. Dionesotes, 603 N.E.2d
118, 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is
the wellspring which feeds the growth of legal guidelines surrounding Terry stops."); Danz
v. Schafer, 422 A.2d 1, 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) ("The wellspring for the confusing
ambivalence of Burleigh v. Miller is found all the way back in Schneider v. Menaquale ....
"); Greer v. Bd. of Educ., 121 Cal. Rptr. 542, 549 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Hoh-
reiter v. Garrison, 81 Cal. App. 2d 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) as "a wellspring of administra-
tive law in this state").
7. The Supreme Court used "watershed" (a high ridge of land that divides two areas
that are drained by different river systems) in Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 867 ("[T]o
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed
decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question."). The water-
shed metaphor also appears in Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15, 22 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2008); Warga v. Palisades Baseball, No. 08MA25, 2009 WL 695438, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2009); and In re Episcopal Church Prop., 76 Va. Cir. 884 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008).
8. "Derelict" has a legal usage, explained in The Laura, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 336, 341
(1871) ("What constitutes a case of derelict has been authoritatively defined by this court:
'The abandonment must have been final, without hope of recovery, or intention to re-
turn."' ) (quoting Cromwell v. The Island City, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 121, 128 (1861)). The
Supreme Court has used the "derelict in the stream of the law" metaphor in North Dakota
State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973); State
Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 457 (1962); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950); and MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufac-
turing Co., 329 U.S. 402, 412 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
9. 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
10. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). What did Justice Douglas mean by "a derelict in the stream of
the law"? Federal Baseball Club held that professional baseball is not trade or commerce,
and therefore the National League-not being engaged in interstate commerce-could not
be found liable for violating federal antitrust law. A generation later, a second Supreme
Court ruling on the same issue acknowledged that baseball was a commercial enterprise
that stretched over state borders, but the strong current of precedent dictated repetition of
the first ruling. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 358-60 (1953) (conceding
that professional baseball is composed of "380 baseball clubs, operating in 42 [s]tates.")
Flood, the third case in this series, reached the same result as the first two, even though
professional baseball was a larger commercial enterprise. 407 U.S. at 286. An exasperated
Justice Douglas protested: "This Court's decision in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League ... is a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, should remove. Only a
romantic view of a rather dismal business account over the last 50 years would keep that
derelict in midstream." Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
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ated with water." Other studies have used statistics, including charts. 12
My study borrows from both approaches.
The metaphorical part uses a concept from the study of rivers. Picture a
loop or bend in a meandering river. These turns can form cutoffs, akin to
a fork in the road. A cutoff is a mechanism for changing the river's path.13
Meandering rivers also carry sediment. This strong force is an important
dynamic for changing a river's course.14 In this study, I analogize prece-
dents to rivers, and I compare the Supreme Court's overruling of its
precedents to a sedimentation process known as deposition (the deposit-
ing of sediment). I measure how often lower courts disregard a Supreme
Court (upstream) precedent when these downstream tribunals believe
the precedent is unworkable, irrelevant, or wrongly decided. Lower
courts disregard precedent by disagreeing with, distinguishing, or ignor-
ing it. When enough courts disregard a precedent, the flow of a lead case
can be clogged by accumulating deposits. In other words, a growing body
of adverse rulings by lower courts is like deposition in the stream of a
precedent.15
11. My approach expands on the imagery of water currents, flow, erosion, and sound
waves in scholarly publications, and offers a theory of water-borne change for Supreme
Court precedents. I emphasize other examples of water metaphors and allusions in italics.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Crimi-
nal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 625 (1984) (developing the concept of acoustic separation
in law, based on the idea that courts address some rules to the general public and other
rules to officials); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Sup-
port Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1705-08 (2005)
(describing how constitutional principles can "channel" both judicial and public policy
thought); Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by Implication, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 151,
152 (2009) ("What if an apparently relevant precedent has been eroded by one or more
later decisions?" (emphasis added)); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571,
580 n.19 (1987) ("Expansion [of precedent] seems more defensible than contraction, and it
is important to think about why expansion of a given decision seems to flow more easily
than contraction." (emphasis added)); Brian P. Wilson, How Should States Treat Cruik-
shank Following Heller? An Analysis of a State Court's Ability to Hold that Supreme Court
Precedent Is Dead, 40 SETON HALL L. REv. 371, 381 (2010) ("Where subsequent Supreme
Court decisions erode the validity of prior decisions, uniformity is already offended.") (em-
phasis added); Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Stan-
dards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143,
1204 (1999) ("In United States v. White, however, the circuit court declined to follow a
Supreme Court precedent because it was a five to four decision, its authority had been
eroded by recent cases, and many of the current justices had explicitly criticized it." (em-
phasis added)).
12. See Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natu-
ral Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 264 tbl.1 (1992) (56.3% of all reversals
from 1789 to 1991 occurred between 1953 and 1991, and that 33.9% occurred between 1969
and 1991); see also Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation:
An Empirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 848 (2004) (a
study, like the present approach, that used statistics and a nature metaphor).
13. Jessica A. Zinger et al., Extreme Sediment Pulses Generated by Bend Cutoffs Along
a Large Meandering River, 4 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 675, 675 (2011).
14. P.J. Wampler, Rivers and Streams-Water and Sediment in Motion, 3 NATURE ED-
UCATION KNOWLEDGE 18 (2012).
15. For a glimpse of how this theory can be applied, consider the following anatomy of
a precedent that accumulates so much "deposition" by downstream courts that the prece-
dent is overruled: Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928), struck down a state law
that required a pharmacy to be entirely owned by pharmacists. Id. at 113-14. Much later,
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The river bend, in my analogy, is a developing trend or change in soci-
ety. In this study, the river bend is the growing disconnect between Hoff-
man Plastic's harsh ruling to foreclose monetary remedies to unlawful
aliens, and increasingly tolerant public opinion about millions of aliens
who reside unlawfully in the United States. If there is enough deposition
of downstream rulings from a precedent, the Supreme Court can recog-
nize this problem. This deposition process is precisely what I document in
the Hoffman Plastic database.
If the Court overrules the precedent, and creates a new precedent, this
is metaphorically like a river forming a cut off in the bend and moving in
a new direction. This aspect of river science relates to my second
database, a comprehensive sample of Supreme Court pairings (called dy-
ads) of an overruled precedent, and the decision that explicitly rejected it.
This part of my study draws from empirical analyses that examine how
the Court overrules itself.16 This study uses statistics to (1) estimate how
long it takes for the Supreme Court to overrule a precedent, and (2) cor-
relate the voting margin in overruled cases with the number of years that
elapse until a new precedent emerges. My study also specifies a prelimi-
nary regression model to predict when the Supreme Court overrules one
of its precedents. In sum, I translates a recurring metaphor that indicates
precedential deposition-"a derelict in the stream of the law"-into em-
pirical research questions that provide answers about how the Supreme
Court alters the course of its precedents.
This study concludes that: (1) most lower courts disregard Hoffman
Plastic, leading to the inference that these adverse rulings are clogging
the precedential value of this case, and (2) Hoffnan Plastic is a good
candidate for being overturned, even though it was decided only 11 years
ago, because (a) the average age of an overturned Supreme Court ruling
the Court in North Dakota Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1977), observed that Liggett "belongs to that vintage of decisions which exalted substan-
tive due process by striking down state legislation which a majority of the Court deemed
unwise." Id. at 164. The Court also recalled that "[w]e commented on [Liggett] disparag-
ingly ... in Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co." Id. (citing 336 U.S. 220 (1949)). Look-
ing back, the Court also remembered that Daniel "stated that a 'pronounced shift of
emphasis since the Liggett case' the Court had deprived the words 'unreasonable' and 'ar-
bitrary' of the meaning which Liggett ascribed to them." Id. (citation omitted). Concluding
with the river metaphor that is the title of this Article, the Court declared: "The Liggett
case, being a derelict in the stream of the law, is hereby overruled." Id. at 167. For an
abbreviated version of this process, see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 50 (1990),
overruling Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883), reasoning: "We think such a reading of
the Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause as it was understood at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, and is not supported by later cases. We accordingly overrule
Kring." Id. (emphasis added).
16. For a similar though less systematic use of the case-accumulation concept, see Earl
M. Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 383 (1988).
In situations in which the relevant doctrine is vague, early interpretations of
that doctrine are likely to generate somewhat inconsistent results. As the
number of interpretations accumulates, however, a clearer picture of the
dominant approach should emerge. By overruling earlier cases inconsistent




is 19.5 years, (b) the most-frequently overruled precedent in my study
was decided by a one-vote margin, as in the case of Hoffman Plastic, and
(c) the deposition process occurring in lower court rulings involving Hoff-
man Plastic may come to the Court's attention and result in overruling of
the case.
B. ORGANIZATION AND OVERVIEW OF THIs ARTICLE
Part II explains the various ways that the Supreme Court overrules its
precedents. Part II.A analyzes why Supreme Court precedents are dura-
ble, even when they are flawed or problematic. However, when certain
problems with a precedent become apparent, the Court overrules the
case. Part II.A also examines external influences, such as change in judi-
cial philosophy, that lead to overruling a precedent. Part II.B explains the
origins of the "derelict in the stream of the law" metaphor. This Part
articulates two key aspects of my theory: (1) cases that are decided by a
close margin are more likely than other precedents to be derelicts be-
cause dissenting opinions can introduce theories and rationales that com-
pete with the precedent's justification, and (2) as strong deposition of
downstream cases accumulate, this can lead the Court to reconsider its
precedent and overrule it.
Part III discusses research methods and data. Part III.A presents re-
search questions for the Hoffman Plastic database, and explains why that
case is a potential "derelict." Part III.B explains how the Hoffman Plastic
and Supreme Court databases were independently developed. Part III.C
reports findings from the statistical analyses. It presents four data tables
for the Hoffman Plastic analysis, and two tables for the Supreme Court
cases.
Part IV discusses how the findings from the Hoffman Plastic and Su-
preme Court databases are interrelated. Part IV.A makes connections be-
tween the statistical results. Part IV.B draws on the discussion in Part
II.A, which describes various reasons that the Court overrules a prece-
dent, and finds similar reasoning in Hoffman Plastic's downstream opin-
ions for disregarding that precedent. These downstream courts appear to
signal Hoffman Plastic's significant problems to the Supreme Court-a
behavior that is part of the overruling process.
Part V presents conclusions. By examining the negative KeyCite trend
for Hoffman Plastic, I suggest this precedent could be implicitly over-
ruled, such as the New York v. Belton precedent,' 7 or explicitly overruled,
like the Booth v. Maryland case.'8 Hoffman Plastic is also a good candi-
date for overruling due to passage of S. 744, a Senate bill that legalizes
the employment of currently unlawful aliens; but the NLRB's tarnished
status due to the disputed recess appointments of its members is a poten-
tial obstacle to reviving the practice of awarding backpay to unlawful
17. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
18. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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aliens who might acquire provisional status under immigration reform. 19
Thus, there is an open question as to whether the Court will be presented
with a direct opportunity to revisit the Hoffman Plastic precedent.
II. OVERRULING PRECEDENT: A THEORY OF HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OVERRULES PRECEDENT
A. How THE SUPREME COURT CHANGES PRECEDENTIAL CURRENTS
The Supreme Court invalidates its precedents in many ways-often by
nuance or deflection, as when it narrows the application of a precedent-
and on rare occasions, by overt statements that overrule the case. Of
course, the Court prefers to uphold the principle of stare decisis.20 This
norm separates a court from a legislature, where the latter can overturn a
law because lawmakers disagree with it.21
Some precedents are virtually immutable. Their potency can be mea-
sured statistically. 22 These so-called "super precedents" are like mighty
rivers.23 Other precedents deter downstream courts from limiting or over-
ruling the opinion by prospectively declaring the operation of a new rule
or principle.24
19. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.
744, 113th Cong. (2013).
20. A classic exposition of this doctrine appears in Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954), a deportation case, referring to the Court's earlier rulings that Congress had au-
thority to exclude aliens (e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). In Galvan, a Mexican immigrant was de-
ported based on specious evidence that he was a member of the Communist Party. Af-
firming the deportation order, Justice Frankfurter wrote,
[M]uch could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the
Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore rec-
ognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of
aliens....
But the slate is not clean. . . . [T]hat the formulation of these policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our
government. And whatever might have been said at an earlier date for apply-
ing the ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that
it has no application to deportation.
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-31 (citations omitted).
21. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking
and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991).
If the Justices were to adopt a low level of deference to precedent (for exam-
ple, overruling a precedent merely deemed erroneously reasoned), then they
will have increased the chances that a subsequent Court will take the same
route. Future Justices could rely on past decisions as expressing a theory of
precedent that supports them in overruling precedent based solely on disa-
greement with the underlying reasoning of those precedents.
Id.
22. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976).
23. Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 364
(2007). Sinclair defines super-precedent as an opinion that is "so effective in defining the
requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from arising in the first place, or, if
they do arise, induces them to be settled without litigation." Id.
24. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 58 (1964).
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Often, the Supreme Court does not need to overrule a precedent di-
rectly to change the law. The stream of precedent can be shifted by
milder measures. A subtle course change occurs when an obsolete prece-
dent is severely limited by later decisions.25 Beyond neglecting a prece-
dent over time, the Court may use "piecemeal" or "implicit" overruling.26
And there are times when the Court is confused as to whether a current
decision does, or does not, overrule a prior decision.27 A precedent may
be treated with such lack of respect that some justices consider it im-
pliedly overruled. 28 Sometimes the Court disapproves a precedent but
stops short of overruling it.2 9
Maintenance of a precedent is not, however, an ironclad law of na-
ture.30 Lower courts play a role in maintaining the vitality of a precedent,
or prompting reconsideration of it. At times, the Supreme Court treats
inferior tribunals like voters who participate in a referendum of the pre-
25. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1985).
26. Some Justices, when annoyed by this approach, call out their brethren. See Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 221 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The real question before
us in this case is whether Wade v. Mayo should be overruled. Whether this overruling is to
be done forthrightly by two words saying the case 'is overruled' or the overruling is euphe-
mistically done by fifteen words hardly changes the fact." (citation omitted)).
An academic perspective appears in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Prece-
dents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1392-93 (1988), noting that in the previous fifteen years "fewer
statutory precedents [were] openly overruled, and then only after a lengthy battle over
procedural and historical arcana, but more of them are overruled implicitly or piecemeal."
The classification of these cases is, to a degree, subjective. Eskridge controls for this prob-
lem by explaining that in an implicitly overruled decision, "the Court does not actually
state that it is overruling the precedent," but "there is evidence within the Court's opinion,
and/or concurring or dissenting opinions, for the proposition that the precedent is over-
ruled, and when subsequent citations of the 'overruled' precedent support the categoriza-
tion." Id. at 1430.
27. See the intense disagreement in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
revealed in a lengthy dissent as to whether cases cited by the majority opinion were already
overruled. 465 U.S. 89, 126-39 (1984) (Stevens J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted,
None of these cases contain only "implicit" or sub silentio holdings; all of
them explicitly consider and reject the claim that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctive relief based on state law.
There is therefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue
presented by this case is an open one.
Id. at 137. The dissent expounded on this view: "The majority incredibly claims that Greene
contains only an implicit holding on the Eleventh Amendment question the Court decides
today. In plain words, the Greene Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
consideration of the pendent state-law claims advanced in that case." Id. at 137 n.14 (cita-
tion omitted).
28. See, e.g., Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 261 (1949) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("I think it an undesirable practice for this Court to overrule past cases without
saying so. The effect of the Court's holding here is to overrule Ettelson v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., decided by a unanimous Court in 1942.") (citation omitted)).
29. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)
("To the extent that Coffey v. United States suggests [that collateral estoppel or double
jeopardy automatically bars a civil, remedial forfeiture proceeding following an acquittal
on related criminal charges], it is hereby disapproved.").
30. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 699 (1964) ("It is true that adherence to
prior decisions in constitutional adjudication is not a blind or inflexible rule. This Court has
shown a readiness to correct its errors even though of long standing.").
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cedent.3 1 Just as rivers change course, so do Supreme Court precedents-
but only rarely, and with reluctance. 32 The judiciary's ability to alter these
currents is a byproduct of Marbury v. Madison, where the Supreme Court
declared its authority to say what the law is. 3 3 In cases and controversies
that arise under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has said that stare
decisis is neither an "inexorable command,"34 nor "a mechanical formula
of adherence to the latest decision."35 Indeed, the Court has preserved its
role to overrule precedents, as necessary. 36 Using this authority, the
Court has overruled landmark precedents that legalized racial segrega-
tion,37 barred a minimum wage law,3 8 and allowed law enforcement to
use wiretaps without a warrant.39
Lower court disrespect for a precedent can signal the Supreme Court
to overrule the case. This communication takes several forms. In extreme
cases, an inferior court opinion mocks a precedent for being outside the
mainstream of law. 40 This process is revealed in Judge Jerome Frank's
insulting reference to Federal Baseball Club as an "impotent zombi." 41
Similarly, state courts engage in open defiance when they "underrule" the
Supreme Court-a term that connotes the overruling of precedent by an
inferior court.42 The more common Supreme Court response to deposi-
tion in a precedential stream is an order that grants certiorari petitions to
resolve circuit splits. Circuit splits are like river bends that create condi-
tions for a cut-off and new direction for the river. Judicial and scientific
terms for these change agents are strikingly similar, referring respectively
to "splits" and "cut-offs."
31. Id. (reasoning that "where so many cases in both federal and state jurisdictions by
such a constellation of eminent jurists over a century and a half's span teach us a principle
which is without contradiction in our case law, we cannot overrule it").
32. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) ("We do
not lightly overrule recent precedent"), overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976); see also Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 196 (1990) (stating
that there are "relatively rare circumstances where established precedent is overruled.").
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that the judicial branch has the power
"to say what the law is," but not the power to change the law).
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
35. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
36. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (J. Powell, concurring)
("It is thus not only our prerogative but also our duty to re-examine a precedent where its
reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly called into question.").
37. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1986).
38. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
39. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), overruling Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
40. For a Supreme Court opinion that worried in these terms, see United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 712 (1993) ("We would mock stare decisis and only add chaos to our
double jeopardy jurisprudence by pretending that Grady survives when it does not." (citing
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)).
41. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1949).
42. This concept is explained in Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 COR-
NELL L. REv. 501, 503-04 (2008) (observing that "[e]very so often . . . state courts actively
disregard binding Supreme Court precedent-sometimes through clever bits of judicial
'subterfuge' and sometimes in a far less timid fashion").
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While the Court hesitates to overrule a precedent, several factors clear
a path to this point of capitulation. When Justices confront a constitu-
tional issue, they feel less beholden to stare decisis.43 More generally, the
Court overrules a precedent when a rule or doctrine becomes unwork-
able,44 or impractical.45 Experience with a precedent may cause the Court
to overrule it.46 When there are profound changes in the conditions that
led to a precedent, the new reality may cause the Court to discard it.47 In
milder forms of this change process, a case is overruled if it outlives its
usefulness, 48 or other precedents intervene to limit its vitality. 49
There are tradeoffs between stare decisis and overruling precedent. A
case may be overruled if a new rule or principle is better than an old
one.50 On rare occasions, the Court realizes that the precedent it over-
ruled is better than the one that replaced it.51 Or, a new line of authority
43. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Since we deal with a constitutional
question, we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas
of the law.").
44. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) (citing the "unworkability" prin-
ciple: "[A] procedural principle of this importance should not be kept on the books in the
name of stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in practice. . . . Kesler should be
pro tanto overruled"), overruling Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Fin. Responsibility Div.,
Utah, 369 U.S. 153 (1962). There are times, however, when the Court rejects the "un-
workability" argument. See Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1080 (2013) ("[W]e have no
reason to believe the existing rules have become so 'unworkable' as to justify overruling
precedent."). See generally Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182-83 (1989); Eskridge,
supra note 41, at 1362 (1988) (criticizing the "super-strong presumption of correctness" for
statutory precedents).
45. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380 (1964) (citing "difficulties inherent in the
New York procedure"), overruling Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
46. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) ("The Court bows to the
lessons of experience . . . recognizing that the process of trial and error . . . is appropriate
also in the judicial function."), overruling Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
47. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 497 (1973) ("De-
velopments [in criminal procedure] since Ahrens have had a profound impact on the con-
tinuing vitality of that decision"), overruling Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); see also
Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 278 (1970) ("Having
concluded that Sinclair was erroneously decided and that subsequent events have under-
mined its continuing validity, we overrule that decision and reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals."), overruling Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
48. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 88, 95 (1980) ("In the 20 years which have
lapsed since the Court's decision in Jones, the two reasons which led the Court to the rule
of automatic standing have likewise been affected by time . . .. We are convinced that the
automatic standing rule of Jones has outlived its usefulness . ), overruling Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
49. See Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 409, 425-26 (1924).
50. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("[I]t is wiser to abandon the 'two-pro-
nged test' established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause deter-
minations."), overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
51. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("[I]f
the precedent under consideration itself departed from the Court's jurisprudence, re-
turning to the intrinsically sounder doctrine established in prior cases may better serve the
values of stare decisis than would following the more recently decided case inconsistent
with the decisions that came before it." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cont'l
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may undermine a precedent so much that the Court feels compelled to
overrule it.52
In some cases, getting the law right is more important than reaffirming
a faulty principle.53 These "do-over" cases occur when justices believe
that a recent case was wrongly decided. 54 The Court may overrule a deci-
sion that "lacks constitutional roots,"5 5 causes "confusion" by overturn-
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) ("In sum, we conclude that the
appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions
prior to Schwinn."), overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
52. See State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 181 (1942) ("[W]e do not think
that First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine should survive. We overrule it. In line
with our recent decisions in Curry v. McCanless, Graves v. Elliott and Graves v. Schmid-
lapp we repeat that there is no constitutional rule of immunity from taxation of intangibles
.... ), overruling First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932); see also Hudgens
v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976), overruling Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue to believe that
the Logan Valley case was rightly decided. Our institutional duty is to follow
until changed the law as it now is, not as some Members of the Court might
wish it to be. And in the performance of that duty we make clear now, if it
was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the
Court's decision in the Lloyd case.
Id. (footnote omitted).
53. This type of reasoning originated in the early years of the Court, when Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), overruled Com-
mercial & R.R. Bank v. Slocomb, 14 Pet. 60 (1840). "After mature deliberation, we feel
free to say that the cases of Strawbridge and Curtiss and that of the Bank and Deveaux
were carried too far, and that consequences and inferences have been argumentatively
drawn from the reasoning employed in the latter which ought not to be followed." Letron,
45 U.S. at 555. A more recent example is Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.
S. 204 (1930), overruling Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1903). "Blackstone v. Miller
no longer can be regarded as a correct exposition of existing law; and to prevent misunder-
standing it is definitely overruled." Id. at 209. The most apologetic version of this rationale
appears in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255 (1970),
partially overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962). Justice Stewart's
confessional concurrence is especially revealing:
When Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson was decided in 1962, I subscribed to
the opinion of the Court. . . . Today I join the Court in concluding "that
Sinclair was erroneously decided and that subsequent events have under-
mined its continuing validity .... "
In these circumstances the temptation is strong to embark upon a lengthy
personal apologia.... An aphorism of Mr. Justice Frankfurter provides me
refuge: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it
merely because it comes late."
Id. (Stewart, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Hen-
slee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
54. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 501 (2007) ("Overruling a constitu-
tional case decided just a few years earlier is far from unprecedented."); Oregon ex rel.
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 382 (1977) ("Since one sys-
tem of resolution of property disputes has been adhered to from 1845 until 1973, and the
other only for the past three years, a return to the former would more closely conform to
the expectations of property owners than would adherence to the latter."), overruling
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
55. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993), overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508 (1990). The Dixon court noted that Grady "lack[ed] constitutional roots" and was
"wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent." Id. The Court went on to
bluntly state, "we think it time to acknowledge what is now, three years after Grady, com-
pellingly clear: the case was a mistake." Id. at 711.
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ing a long line of precedents, 56 signifies "an abrupt and largely
unexplained departure" from precedent,57 or contradicts or ignores the
original intent of a law.58 When a precedent proves to be impractical or
harmful in its application, the Court may overrule it.59 Broad societal
change, 60 or enactment of a conflicting law after the precedent, 61 may
cause the Court to overrule a precedent. In other cases, a fundamental
change in judicial philosophy causes the Court to overrule a precedent. 62
Some cases are overruled because they have "repugnant reasoning." 63 A
case may be overruled because it declares a principle that is no longer
56. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450 (1987) (overruling because of "con-
fusion wrought by prior decision), overruling O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
The Solorio Court also stated that O'Callahan had rejected "an unbroken line of decisions
from 1866 to 1960." Id. at 439-40.
57. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977) (because Arnold was
"an abrupt and largely unexplained departure" from precedent).
58. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32 (1986) ("[T]o the extent that it states
that mere lack of due care by a state official may 'deprive' an individual of life, liberty, or
property under the Fourteenth Amendment [when prison custodians] "leav[e] a pillow on
the prison stairs, or mislay[] an inmate's property."), overruling Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (1981); see also Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)
(disagreeing with the reasoning of the Frank majority: "In our opinion, these arguments
unduly discount the purposes behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment"), overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
59. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1978) ("[T]hough our assessment of
the history and meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause in ... Jenkins . .. occurred only
three Terms ago, our vastly increased exposure to the various facets of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause has now convinced us that Jenkins was wrongly decided."), overruling United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
60. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-35 (1975) (involving a state law that pre-
cluded women from compulsory jury duty because women played a distinctive role in soci-
ety), overruling Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Overruling Hoyt, the Taylor Court
reasoned: "A system excluding all women, however, is a wholly different matter. It is un-
tenable to suggest these days that it would be a special hardship for each and every woman
to perform jury service or that society cannot spare any women from their present duties."
Id.
61. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18
(1917) ("[I]t must be accepted by us as a most persuasive expression of the public policy of
our country with respect to the question before us. . . . [T]he decision in Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co.. .. must be regarded as overruled."), overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1 (1912).
62. See Amy Coney Barret, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1711 (2013); see also Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical Inaccuracy of the
Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for Su-
preme Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REv. 969 (2008) (showing that Justice Brandeis's ap-
proach to applying the doctrine of stare decisis in cases involving constitutional
interpretation was not the product of historical practice, but instead, reflected his own legal
realist jurisprudence).
63. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940) ("Appellant relies upon Colgate v.
Harvey .. . to support his argument that the present statute ... violates the privileges and
immunities clause.... [W]e look upon the decision in that case as repugnant to the line of
reasoning adopted here. . . . Colgate v. Harvey . . . is overruled." (citation and footnote
omitted)), overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
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"authoritative,"6 promotes an "aberrational doctrine," 65 or relies on a
flawed understanding of the Constitution. 66
B. How THE SUPREME COURT OVERRULES PRECEDENT
A derelict often begins with a closely decided Supreme Court ruling
that is meant to serve as a precedent.67 The primary definition of "dere-
lict" relates not only to water-borne transport, but connotes disruptive
change in a large body of water: "Forsaken, abandoned, left by the pos-
sessor or guardian; esp. of a vessel abandoned at sea; transf said of land
left dry by the recession of the sea."68 A derelict precedent can begin with
a closely decided Supreme Court ruling. A derelict is not simply a
wrongly decided case. It is so problematic that the Court is compelled to
retreat from it.69 Thus, the voting margin for a Supreme Court opinion is
likely to be correlated with a derelict. A unanimous opinion, decided by a
9-0 vote, is less likely to produce a cardinal error in the law. Nine Justices
are less likely to produce a bad precedent than five. Also, in a closely
decided case, there is usually a dissenting opinion. This increases the
chance that a derelict will be overruled because downstream judges, and
future Justices, are shown pathways to correct the stream of law. 7 0
64. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976) ("We do not believe the
reasoning in Wirtz may any longer be regarded as authoritative."), overruling Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
65. When Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), overruled Kesler v. Department of
Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), the Court stated, "We can no longer adhere to the
aberrational doctrine of Kesler and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation of
federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind
other than one of frustration." Perez, 402 U.S. at 651-52. The opinion elaborated by ex-
plaining that Kesler's approach "is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our
Supremacy Clause cases." Id.
66. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967) (noting that "[o]ur holding . .. is the
only one that can stand in view of the language and the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and our construction of that Amendment ... comports more nearly than Perez with
the principles .. . that the entire Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to guarantee," and
concluding that "[ojur holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his
own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relin-
quishes that citizenship. Perez v. Brownell is overruled."), overruling Perez v. Brownell,
365 U.S. 44 (1958).
67. I adhere to the definition of precedent provided in Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity
in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 481 n.102 (1984) ("[A]n adequate theory of
precedent will treat both holding on the facts and rationale as part of what is precedent.").
A thoughtful discussion of the concept of precedent also appears in Joseph W. Mead, Stare
Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787 (2011-2012), which
discusses vertical and horizontal precedent, and comity.
68. Derelict Definition, OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcnONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/En
try/50569 (emphasis added).
69. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) ("We feel bound to con-
clude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled."),
overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
70. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651,
661-62 (1995) (detailing how Judge Parker, in Barnette v. West Virginia Board of Educa-
tion, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), made a "prescient" prediction by noticing the
rapidly declining margin of apparent voting support for Gobitis by reading the growing
number of Gobitis detractors in Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)).
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Alternatively, a derelict may occur as economic conditions or judicial
philosophy transform. This appears to be the case for Federal Baseball
Club, the 1922 opinion that prompted Justice Douglas, in Flood v. Kuhn,
to declare it "a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator,
should remove."71 His point was that by 1970 the Supreme Court had
long since abandoned its narrow conception of the interstate commerce
clause 7 2-the reasoning that led the Federal Baseball majority to con-
clude that professional baseball was not in interstate commerce.
While more than one process leads the Supreme Court to overrule a
precedent, my theory focuses on a cumulative phenomenon. This process
begins with an accretion of lower court rulings that break from the prece-
dent.73 These opinions openly question the case, disagree with it, distin-
guish it, cite a stronger or more apt precedent, or ignore it altogether.
This cumulative process advances when the Supreme Court recognizes
this deposition effect over time. In a narrowly decided case, the deposi-
tion process starts with sharply critical dissenting opinions. In some cases,
Justices have long memories of these disagreements. They cite the narrow
margin of support as justification for overruling the precedent. 74
71. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
72. Id. at 286 (citing overruled or discredited cases that the narrow and parochial view
of commerce in 1922).
73. This idea is embodied in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) ("Revisiting
precedent is particularly appropriate where, as here, a departure would not upset expecta-
tions, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule that was recently adopted to improve the
operation of the courts, and experience has pointed up the precedent's shortcomings.").
74. The Court articulated the reasoning of this theory in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828-29 (1991) ("Booth and Gathers were decided by the narrowest of margins, over
spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions."). See also the
reasoning in Chief Justice Chase's dissent in Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870), over-
ruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). Chief Justice Chase was part of a
4-3 majority opinion that ruled that a statute creating paper money violated the Fifth
Amendment. Due to a change in the composition of the Supreme Court, brought about by
legislation to increase the size of the Court, and also due to turnover in the Court's mem-
bership, Chief Justice Chase reasoned that too few votes existed to overrule Hepburn:
By law the Supreme Court at that time consisted of the Chief Justice and
seven associate justices, the act of Congress having provided that no vacancy
in the office of associate justice should be filled until the number should be
reduced to six. Five of the number, including the Chief Justice, concurred in
the opinion in that case, and the judgment of the State court was affirmed,
three of the associate justices dissenting. Since that time one of the justices
who concurred in that opinion of the court has resigned, and Congress hav-
ing increased the number of the associate justices to eight, the two cases
before the court have been argued, and the result is that the opinion deliv-
ered in the former case is overruled, five justices concurring in the present
opinion and four dissenting. Five justices concurred in the first opinion, and
five have overruled it. Persuaded that the first opinion was right, for the rea-
sons already assigned, it is not possible that I should concur in the second
Id. at 604 (Chase, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The possible effect that turnover on
the Court can have on a fragile precedent is discussed in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Especially ought the Court not re-enforce
needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief that Law is the
expression of chance-for instance, of unexpected changes in the Court's composition and
the contingencies in the choice of successors.").
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In another overruling process, the Supreme Court openly recognizes
the growing deposition of lower court opinions that disregard and disre-
spect the precedent.75 The Court may reaffirm the precedent and narrow
the precedential stream to a trickle by confining the questionable ruling
to a special situation (as Flood did for major league baseball). On the
other hand, the Court may be more likely to overrule a precedent when
"deposits" of adverse treatment by lower courts rapidly accumulate
downstream.76 The Court is more likely to perceive this developing situa-
tion as a problem that needs urgent attention.
This study focuses on a particular process for overruling a precedent:
cumulative disregard and disrespect by downstream courts causes the
Court to reverse itself.77 It should be noted that a strong deposition of
cases does not necessarily result in overruling. Justices often ignore this
problem, or they take a less disruptive course by implicitly overruling the
case.
The dyad of Saucier v. Katz, 78 overruled by Pearson v. Callahan,79 of-
fers a recent example of implicit overruling in response to deposition of
adverse rulings by lower courts. From 2001 through 2009, Saucier was
widely disregarded by lower courts, with numerous decisions disagreeing
with it,80 calling it into doubt,8 ' declining to extend it,82 distinguishing
75. At times, the Court cites the accumulation of lower court rulings and criticism as a
reason for overruling a precedent. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (discuss-
ing how trial courts criticized the Saucier rule).
76. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
77. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978) (because Monroe
was a "departure from prior practice"), partially overruling, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961).
78. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
79. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
80. See Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2007); Hatfield-Bermudez v.
Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 60 (1st Cir. 2007); Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 208
(2d Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Williams, 584 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2008); Ruiz v. Leba-
non Cnty., Pa., No. 1:04-cv-02359, 2007 WL 2907813, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2007); Sheldon
v. City of Ambler, 178 P.3d 459, 461 (Ala. 2008).
81. See Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 473 (6th Cir. 2008); Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d
707, 709 (7th Cir. 2008).
82. See Lawrence v. Chabot, 182 Fed. App'x 442, 452 (6th Cir. 2006); Leary v. City of
Pontiac, No. 06-11029, 2008 WL 718287, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2008); Doe ex rel. Doe
v. Preston, 472 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22 (D. Mass. 2007).
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it,83 and stating reservations about it.84 The Pearson Court explained that
"[flower court judges, who have had the task of applying the Saucier rule
on a regular basis for the past eight years, have not been reticent in their
criticism of Saucier's 'rigid order of battle." 85 While Pearson responded
to the growing deposition of adverse rulings, it did not expressly overrule
Saucier. To the contrary, the opinion carefully stated, "Although we now
hold that the Saucier protocol should not be regarded as mandatory in all
cases, we continue to recognize that it is often beneficial." 86 KeyCite re-
ports, however, indicate that over 700 downstream courts regard Saucier
as an overruled precedent,87 even though Pearson's only express mention
of "overrule" is at the beginning of the opinion, where the Court stated
that the parties were directed "to address the question whether Saucier
should be overruled." 8 After that one mention, the Court never used
that word.
But there are occasions when the adverse reactions by lower courts
appear to cause the Supreme Court to expressly overrule a precedent.
The combination of Booth v. Maryland,89 and South Carolina v. Gath-
ers,90 both overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,91 is a recent example. In de-
83. Listed in reverse chronological order. See Vance v. Wade, 546 F.3d 774, 781 (6th
Cir. 2008); HR Acquisition I Corp. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 1309, 1318 (11th Cir.
2008); Petzak v. Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Corrections, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (D. Nev.
2008); Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 2008); Mazloum v. D.C. Metro. Police
Dep't, 522 F. Supp. 2d 24, 33 (D.D.C. 2007); Alley-Barnes v. Sackman, No. C06-8822, 2007
WL 2363050, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2007); Niznik v. City of Minneapolis, No. CIVO5-
32, 2007 WL 270416, at *7 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2007); Caputo v. Rio Rancho Police Dep't,
CIVO5-32, 2006 WL 4063018, at *3 (D.N.M. 2006); Woods v. City of Wellston, 2005 WL
1406105, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2005); Rosenberger v. Kootenai Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't,
103 P.3d 466, 469 (Idaho 2004); Ferrin v. Bias, No. EDCVO20535RTSGLX, 2004 WL
5375474, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2004); Lodato v. Ortiz, 314 F. Supp. 2d 379, 386 (D.N.J.
2004); Schmitt v. Rashid, 2004 WL 813763, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Acevedo-Garcia v. Mon-
roig, 351 F.3d 547, 565 (1st Cir. 2003); Ehrlich v. Town of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48, 55 (2d
Cir. 2003); Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2003); Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d
520, 523 (4th Cir. 2003); Hummel v. City of Carlisle, 229 F. Supp. 2d 839, 851 (S.D. Ohio
2002); Mathis v. Best, No. 2:99-CV-111, 2002 WL 483536, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2002);
Springer v. Henry, No. 00-885 (GNS), 2002 WL 389136, at *6 (D. Del. Mar. 11, 2002);
Acevedo Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 213 F. Supp. 2d 42, 50 (D.P.R. 2002); Johnson v.
Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002); Estate of Torres v. Terhune, No. CIV. S-98-
2211 WBSGGH, 2002 WL 32107949, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2002); Estate of Palma v.
Edwards, No. 99 C4896, 2001 WL 1104716, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2001); Tavakoli-Nouri
v. Maryland, 779 A.2d 992, 1001 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
84. See Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir. 2008); Clement v. City of Glen-
dale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1093, (9th Cir. 2008); Wysong v. City of Heath, 260 Fed. App'x 848,
854 (6th Cir. 2008).
85. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009).
86. Id. at 236.
87. Federal appellate courts also regard Saucier as an overruled precedent. E.g., Bar-
nard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2013); Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th
Cir. 2013); Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013); Bergdoll v.
City of York, 515 Fed. App'x 165 (3d Cir. 2013); Mazzeo v. Young, 510 Fed. App'x 646,647
(9th Cir. 2013); Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 2013); Bailey v. Pataki, 708
F.3d 391, 404 (2d Cir. 2013).
88. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
89. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
90. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
91. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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ciding that the Eighth Amendment does not bar a capital sentencing jury
from considering certain types of victim impact evidence, Payne expressly
overruled Booth and Gathers, stating, "To the extent that this Court held
to the contrary in Booth and Gathers those cases are overruled." 92 In
taking this action, the Court said that Booth and Gathers "have defied
consistent application by the lower courts." 93 In the short time prior to
Payne, Booth had undergone a smaller but still noticeable deposition of
adverse rulings similar to Saucier.94
C. Is HOFFMAN PLASTIC A "DERELICT IN THE
STREAM OF THE LAW"?
A Supreme Court case from 2002, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v.
N.L.R.B.,95 provides a natural experiment for this study. The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged an employer with discriminating
against an unlawful alien, Jose Castro, by firing him in retaliation for sup-
porting a union organizing effort. 96 During lengthy litigation of this unfair
labor practice complaint, the employer discovered that Castro had
presented fraudulent immigration documents, hiding the fact that he was
an unlawful alien who was ineligible to work under the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).97 The NLRB ordered backpay for
the 4.5 years that this fraud was concealed, but refused to order
reinstatement. 98
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, upheld the NLRB's
award of backpay to Castro,99 but in a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court said
that the NLRB's monetary remedy "unduly trench[ed] upon" the IRCA
because the employee violated the IRCA's premise that no unlawful alien
be employed in the U.S. 10 Chief Justice Rehnquist equated Castro's
fraudulent tendering of employment verification documents to NLRB
cases involving a violent mob engaged in a sit-down strike, and to mutiny
on a U.S. flagged ship.101 Specifically, the opinion stated that the IRCA
92. Id. at 829.
93. Id. at 830.
94. Numerous courts declined to extend the holding in Booth, including State v. Quick,
405 S.E.2d 179, 194 (N.C. 1991); People v. Benson, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 853 (Cal. 1990);
People v. Sanchez, 563 N.E.2d 1127, 1139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); United States v. Whitehead,
30 M.J. 1066, 1070 (A.M.C.R. 1990); People v. Fields, 555 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); State v. Scherreiks, 451 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Young, 543
N.E.2d 986, 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Turner, 539 N.E.2d 1196, 1213 (Ill. 1989);
Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1064 (8th Cir. 1988); and People v. Cissna, 524
N.E.2d 268, 272 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). The holding of Booth was limited in both People v.
Gutirrez, 564 N.E.2d 850, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), and People v. Morton, 543 N.E.2d 1366,
1374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). State v. Keith, 754 P.2d 474, 487 (Mont. 1988), did not follow
Booth on state law grounds.
95. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
96. Id. at 140-41.
97. Id. at 141.
98. Id. at 141-42.
99. Id. at 142.
100. Id. at 152.
101. Id. at 143.
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"makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer ver-
ification system by tendering fraudulent documents, § 1324c(a), an of-
fense that Castro committed when obtaining employment with
petitioner." 10 2 The holding not only deprived the NLRB of authority to
order backpay for any unlawful alien, 03 but its broad language also im-
plied that unlawful aliens should not receive a monetary remedy in any
other work-related action because this would reward a worker's illegal
presence in the U.S.104 Hoffman Plastic invited lower courts to extend
this principle to other employment disputes, without being specific.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was starkly oppositional: "Without
the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the Board can
impose only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers-
for it has no other weapons in its remedial arsenal." 05 Worrying that the
majority opinion lowered the cost to employers for violating the rights of
their employees, he added that the majority opinion "increases the em-
ployer's incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees." 06
What makes Hoffman Plastic a possible derelict? Ultimately, that is an
empirical question-a matter that I investigate in Parts III and IV of this
Article. But there are initial indications of its dereliction. For one, the
case was not only decided in a close vote, but there was sharp disagree-
ment in the majority and dissenting opinions. 107 During the relatively
short time that has elapsed since Hoffman Plastic was decided, academic
studies have drawn attention to downstream cases that did not extend the
reasoning and ruling of this precedent to cases involving unlawful aliens
who sued over wage and hour issues and other work-related com-
plaints.'08 In other words, this research gave a qualitative impression of
102. Id. at 138.
103. Id. at 137.
104. Id. at 150 ("[A]warding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the immigra-
tion laws, it also condones and encourages future violations."). The opinion further noted
that "[i]t would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authori-
ties, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations."
Id. at 152.
105. Note the invitation to lower courts to extend the holding in this case, when Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Indeed, awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes
the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations." Id. at 150 (em-
phasis added). In fact, nearly all of the cases in the Hoffman Plastic database in this study
were cases like Hoffnan Plastic. The point is that the Hoffman Plastic opinion made no
effort to limit its holding to NLRB cases.
106. Id. at 155.
107. See id. at 153-61.
108. A comprehensive example appears in Christine N. Cimini, Undocumented Work-
ers and Concepts of Fault: Are Courts Engaged in Legitimate Decisionmaking?, 65 VAND.
L. REV. 389 (2012) (documenting division among courts in Hoffman Plastic-type cases).
See also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the Fifth
Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 27, 34-41 (2008) (reporting on different approaches
taken by post-Hoffman Plastic courts); ); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the
Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1400 (2009) (contrasting courts
that conclude "that unauthorized workers should enjoy fewer rights under federal wage
and antidiscrimination statutes," and a larger group of courts that award remedies to these
aliens); Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2224, 2242-44
(2005) (reporting cases that rejected employer attempts to extend Hoffman Plastic); Mat-
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accumulating deposition. This was the jumping-off point for my analysis.
But how much deposition is occurring? Is it declining, holding steady, or
growing? Is the adverse deposition limited to high-visibility cases re-
ported in earlier studies, or is it a broad process? I take up these ques-
tions in Part III.
III. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA
A. WHY HoFFMAN PLASTIC IS A TEST CASE
My first database is comprised of published federal and state court
opinions that were decided from 2002-2012, in which an employer asked
a court to apply Hoffman Plastic. Typically, employers wanted a court to
deny a monetary remedy to a known or suspected unlawful alien. My
earlier study using this database focused on the success rate of unautho-
rized aliens in work-related actions against employers. The study con-
cluded that these plaintiffs won between 60% of cases involving
complaints about working conditions (e.g., discrimination) and 77.5%
concerning pay (e.g., minimum wage or overtime). As to the type of law
under which aliens filed a legal complaint, these plaintiffs won between
53.3% (for scaffolding law cases) and 77.1% (Fair Labor Standards Act
cases) of the rulings.109
The main finding of the research was that unlawful aliens had more
success in a legal proceeding against an employer than Jose Castro, the
worker who was denied backpay in Hoffman Plastic. That finding
prompted the new research question in this study, namely, what was the
legal reasoning behind the rulings in these cases? Specifically, this study
asks: Between 2002 and 2012, how often did courts (a) apply the Hoffman
Plastic precedent, (b) apply the precedent with limitations, (c) distinguish
the precedent, or (d) not cite the precedent when a party argued for its
application? To answer this question, I created and analyzed a database
of federal and state court cases involving an employer argument to apply
Hoffman Plastic.110
thew S. Panach, Comment, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right... To Receive Backpay?: The
Post-Hoffman Polarity of Escobar and Rivera, 60 ARK. L. REV. 907, 941-44 (2008) (high-
lighting polarity in judicial attempts to apply Hoffman Plastic to Title VII claims); Craig
Robert Senn, Proposing a Uniform Remedial Approach for Undocumented Workers under
Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 145-55 (2008) (com-
paring three different remedial approaches taken by post-Hoffman Plastic courts); Angel
A. Darmer, Comment, Reconciling IRCA with the Anti-Retaliation Provisions of the
NLRA: How Far Should Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB Be Extended?, 34
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 687, 702-11 (2011) (courts continue to disagree as to whether the
Hoffman Plastic holding and rationale should be extended).
109. Michael H. LeRoy, Remedies for Unlawful Alien Workers: One Law for the Native
and for the Stranger Who Resides in Your Midst? An Empirical Analysis," 28 GEO. IM-
MIGR. L.J. 2 (2013).
110. There were 128 first-level rulings by a court or administrative tribunal, such as a
workers' compensation board; 78 appellate court rulings; and 5 rulings by a state supreme




This study also examines the element of time by asking whether judicial
disregard for Hoffman Plastic has changed or been constant over two pe-
riods-2002-2006 and 2007-2012. Relating this question to the river met-
aphor, this study's purpose is to look for a possible trend in the
deposition of adverse cases in Hoffman Plastic's precedential stream.
Specifically, I analyze the following data to answer these questions:
(1) For the full observation period (2002-2012), how did trial courts at
the federal and state level use the Hoffman Plastic precedent? Did they
apply it, distinguish it, partly apply it, or not cite it?
(2) For the full observation period (2002-2012), how did appellate
courts at the federal and state level use the Hoffman Plastic precedent?
Did they apply it, distinguish it, partly apply it, or not cite it?
(3) Dividing the sample into early cases (decided 2002-2006) and more
recent cases (decided 2007-2012), did trial courts at the federal and state
level use the Hoffman Plastic precedent less often over time?
(4) Dividing the sample into early cases (decided 2002-2006) and more
recent cases (decided 2007-2012), did appellate courts at the federal and
state level use the Hoffman Plastic precedent less often over time?
B. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS
I created two separate databases for this study: a Hoffman Plastic
database and a Supreme Court database.
1. The Hoffman Plastic Database
This is a comprehensive collection of 128 published federal and state
court opinions in which an employer, or employer proxy (e.g., an insur-
ance company in a worker's compensation or wrongful death case) ar-
gued to a court that the Hoffman Plastic precedent precludes a monetary
award to a worker (or legal surrogate, such as a surviving spouse), who
was known or suspected to be an unlawful alien.
To qualify for inclusion, a case met three criteria. First, each one in-
volved an alien who was known or suspected to be unlawfully employed
in the U.S. 11' Second, the plaintiff-worker alleged that the employer (or
its party in interest, e.g., insurance company in a workplace injury case)
violated a work-related law (e.g., minimum wage) or was obligated by
such a law to pay for a work related entitlement (e.g., income and ex-
penses in workers' compensation law). 112 Third, a case after Hoffman
111. The sample also included employees who were authorized to work in the United
States, and remained unlawfully employed after their permits expired. See Chopra v. U.S.
Prof'ls, LLC, No. W2004-01189-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 280346, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
2, 2005). Chopra entered the United States legally under an H-1B visa obtained by his
employer, but when his employer failed to fulfill its obligations to pay Chopra at the pre-
vailing wage rate under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, his legal employment status was nullified. Id.
112. I use the term "worker" rather than employee because in some cases an unlawful
alien performed work for one employer (e.g., a construction sub-contractor), but sued a




Plastic involved a court ruling on the availability of a monetary remedy or
a procedural motion regarding the relevance of an alien's immigration
status for the remedy issue.
Using these criteria, I developed a comprehensive sample of cases. De-
rived from Westlaw's Internet service, the sample began with all federal
and state rulings that were indicated in Westlaw's KeyCite feature for
Hoffman Plastic through December 2012. I read each case on this list to
determine if it met the criteria for this analysis. When a case met all three
conditions, it was added to a roster of decisions.
I followed up by reading the case to extract data for variables on the
survey. For example, the form listed a variable for the general type of
complaint (e.g., injury, pay, working conditions, termination, and others);
the type of court (federal or state for one question, and trial or appellate
for another item); and the party who won at trial or on appeal (plaintiff,
defendant, or partly both). Key to this study, a variable measured how
trial and appellate courts used Hoffman Plastic as a precedent (by citing
it, partially citing it, distinguishing it, or not discussing it). All variables
were assigned numerical values so that they could be coded to an SPSS
database for analysis.
Each valid case was KeyCited to see if it was cited in a downstream
decision that raised a Hoffman Plastic issue. Sometimes, these down-
stream cases made no mention of Hoffman Plastic, even though they
dealt with a monetary remedy issue for an unlawful alien. These cases
were treated as an indirect tributary of Hoffman Plastic and were added
to the sample if they met all the inclusion criteria.
To illustrate, a state appellate court in Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC 113
cited Hoffman Plastic, and therefore it appeared in Hoffman Plastic's
KeyCite list. Later, Ramroop v. Flexo-Craft Printing, Inc.114 cited
Balbuena without mentioning Hoffman Plastic. Because this case in-
volved a Hoffman Plastic issue,115 Ramroop is an indirect tributary of
Hoffman Plastic. Therefore, it was included in the sample. Data were col-
lected for these indirect downstream cases. These cases were also
KeyCited to discover more cases that met the inclusion criteria.
113. 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1250-51, 54, 56 (N.Y. 2006). This Balbuena opinion followed a
complex litigation trail. See Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 787 N.Y.S. 2d 35 (App. Div.
2004) rev'd, 845 N.E.2d 1246 (N.Y. 2006), for an earlier Balubena decision.
114. See 896 N.E.2d 69, 74-75 (N.Y. 2008).
115. While employed as a printer, Ramroop severely crushed his hand in a workplace
accident. Id. at 70. Although he received a workers' compensation award, his case was
reopened after he was interviewed and evaluated by the workers' compensation board for
rehabilitation services. Id. When that agency ruled that he was ineligible for services due to
his unlawful status, Ramroop moved to receive additional compensation. Id. The em-
ployer's insurance carrier intervened to oppose to his application. Id. While the Hoffman
Plastic precedent was never argued to the Ramroop court, the case clearly involved the
type of monetary relief issue in Hoffman Plastic.
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2. The Supreme Court Database
I developed this database to be the most comprehensive set of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions that overruled another Supreme Court decision.
I began with keyword searches, such as "overruled by," "we overrule,"
"overruling," "is overruled," and similar in Westlaw's Supreme Court
database. These searches produced a mix of valid and invalid cases. When
reading decisions and concluding that one case appeared to overrule an
earlier Supreme Court decision, I confirmed this impression by checking
the "Full History" and "Citation References" for the earlier (i.e., over-
ruled) decision.
Over time, I generated a growing roster of pairings (also called dyads)
of Supreme Court cases comprised of precedents that were overruled,
and newly created precedents that overruled an earlier case. They are
listed as matched pairs in the Appendix (Part VI.B, infra). In my pursuit
of an exhaustive sample, I contacted a Westlaw reference librarian to see
if there is an advanced search method to discover all Supreme Court
cases that have been overruled. After some investigation, Westlaw re-
ported back that it has no such search feature.
I also researched law review articles by subject and keyword searches,
and found published lists of Supreme Court cases that were (a) overruled
decisions, and (b) overruling decisions. I compared these lists to mine and
read the cases to make sure that they met my strict criteria for inclusion
to the sample. I added unduplicated cases to the roster.116
Finally, while reading two Supreme Court opinions that overruled a
precedent, I found passages that contained more cases for the
database.117 Again, I checked that list against my roster, read those cases
to ensure that they matched my inclusion criteria, and added undupli-
cated cases.
Important to note, I did not include borderline cases-sometimes
treated as cases that are implicitly overruled.118 For example, the Su-
preme Court has numerous precedents that later courts have abrogated,
criticized, disagreed with, and called into doubt-terms that KeyCite
uses. The point is illustrated with United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 119 No
Supreme Court decision expressly overruled Knight. The precedent is no
116. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 41, at 1362; Maltz, supra note 16, at 467.
Maltz's study found that before 1959 the Court was reluctant to reverse itself (doing so in
only 60 cases), but thereafter, the Court adopted a more activist approach and overturned
its own cases 47 times in the 1960s and 1970s. Maltz, supra note 16, at 467. I also added
what appears to be the earliest Supreme Court decision overruling its precedent, reported
in Amy L. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Deci-
sion's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 82 GEO. L. J. 1689, 1694 (1994) (Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 41, overruled by Hudson v.
Guestier, 10 U.S. 281 (1810)).
117. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 & no. 1 (1991) (listing 33 overruling
decisions); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 255 U.S. 393, 406 n.1, 407 n.2 (1932) (listing
27 cases that the Court overruled).
118. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1392-93.
119. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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longer valid, however. At various times the Supreme Court has criticized
itl20 or disagreed with it.121 According to KeyCite, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals treated Knight as an abrogated case.122
This discussion emphasizes the strict criteria I applied to the database
of Supreme Court cases. The dyads created by these methods were like
the pairs reported in previous studies,123 with the main difference being
that my sample was larger. In several cases, a published study treated a
Supreme Court ruling as an overruled precedent, but my own reading did
not confirm this conclusion.124 I did not take on faith that a published
study's treatment of a case as being overruled meant that the case met the
strict standards for this sample. Also, the sample did not include Supreme
Court precedents that were overruled by statute. Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford,125 which was overturned by the Fourteenth Amendment,126 is such
a case.
I read the overruled decision to determine its voting pattern-specifi-
cally, the number of justices who were part of the majority or concurring
opinion. The theory for this approach is that precedents decided by a
fractured majority are more likely to be overruled in the near-term, while
those that are unanimously decided are more likely to endure. Occasion-
ally, judges have used this reasoning in deciding whether a precedent is
still valid. Consider Judge Parker's reasoning in Barnette v. West Virginia
State Board of Education,127 involving a First Amendment challenge by a
Jehovah's Witness to a school requirement that children salute the flag.
Two years before this case was brought before a panel of federal judges,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a nearly identical requirement in Miners-
120. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122 (1942); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 39 (1937).
121. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995).
122. United States v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002).
123. A similar approach appears in Padden, supra note 131, at 1725 (Appendix).
124. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), overruled by Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62 (1991). Cage is a borderline case that was excluded from the sample. The case was
reported as overruled in Padden, supra note 131, at 1725. A KeyCite check of Cage shows a
red flag, indicating overruling. But a close reading of Estelle shows that the Court did not
expressly overrule Cage. Instead, the Estelle court said:
We acknowledge that language in the later cases of Cage v. Louisiana ...
might be read as endorsing a different standard of review for jury instruc-
tions. . . . So that we may once again speak with one voice on this issue, we
now disapprove the standard of review language in Cage and Yates, and reaf-
firm the standard set out in Boyde.
Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72, n.4 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Similarly, it appears that
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981) was overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 24 (1982). But the majority opinion in Ross never used the term "overrule," and the
dissenting opinion of Justice White stated "the Court unambiguously overrules 'the dispo-
sition' of Robbins though it gingerly avoids stating that it is overruling the case itself."
Ross, 45 U.S. at 841 (citation omitted).
125. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superceded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV.
126. For elaboration, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999). See also State v.
Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 663 (R.I. 2004).
127. 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942).
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ville School District v. Gobitis.128 Nonetheless, as a result of turnover on
the Court, Judge Parker counted the likely votes to reaffirm Gobitis, and
predicted that the Court would overrule this precedent. Judge Parker
ruled, therefore, in anticipation of this outcome.12 9 He was correct. The
Supreme Court, with a somewhat different group of Justices, overruled
Gobitis.130
Returning to this study's methodology, I counted votes in the majority
and concurring opinions as positive votes of equal value for a prece-
dent. 131 Next, I counted the number of justices who dissented, in whole or
in part. These were counted as negative votes of equal value for the pre-
cedent. In addition, cases were read to see if one or more justice did not
participate in a decision. This was not a rare situation. Finally, I consulted
the Supreme Court's website that summarized the Court's history since
its inception under the Federal Judiciary Act.132 This summary provided
accurate information about the number of justices for particular years in
which a decision was made.
To demonstrate this counting process, consider the earliest dyad, Wil-
son v. Daniel133and its overruling decision, Gordon v. Ogden.134 In estab-
lishing a Supreme Court, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided one chief
justice and five associate justices.135 Wilson was decided by six justices.
Justice Iredell was a solitary dissenter. Thus, Wilson was scored as a 5-1
decision. This meant that the Wilson-Gordon dyad scored a "4" for the
variable labeled "Vote Margin." The variable recorded the difference be-
tween positive and negative votes for the overruled opinion. The second
variable was "Years Passed," indicating the number of years that elapsed
128. See 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
129. Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252-53 ("Ordinarily we would feel constrained to follow
an unreversed decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, whether we agreed with
it or not.. . . The developments with respect to the Gobitis case, however, are such that we
do not feel that it is incumbent upon us to accept it as binding authority. Of the seven
justices now members of the Supreme Court who participated in that decision, four have
given public expression to the view that it is unsound, the present Chief Justice in his
dissenting opinion rendered therein and three other justices in a special dissenting opinion
in Jones v. City of Opelika" (citations omitted)).
130. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("The decision
of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few per
curiam decisions which preceded and foreshadowed it are overruled ..... ).
131. To be clear, I counted a vote in the majority, plurality, and concurrence as one
vote per Justice. Research that replicates the approach in this study might give less weight
to a concurring opinion, counting it as a mild form of "depositing" downstream obstruction
to the precedent insofar as the concurrence introduces a different and possibly competing
basis for deciding a legal issue. Perhaps a concurrence would be valued as a half-vote or
three-quarters vote because it lays the ground for a divergent approach to an issue. The
reason I gave the same weight to concurring and majority votes is that both votes contrib-
uted equally to the outcome in the precedent.
132. See The Supreme Court of the United States and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD.
CrR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsflpage/courts-supreme.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2013).
133. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401 (1798), overruled in part by Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U.S. 33
(1830).
134. 28 U.S. 33 (1830).
135. The Supreme Court of the United States and the Federal Judiciary, supra note 132.
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from the first opinion to its overruling decision. In all, the Wilson-Gordon
dyad was scored as a 4 for "Vote Margin," and 32 for "Years Passed"
between the first and second decision.
C. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND FINDINGS
The Hoffman Plastic and Supreme Court database are comprised, re-
spectively, of 128 and 154 cases. The Hoffman Plastic sample has no U.S.
Supreme Court cases, while the other sample is strictly comprised of
cases from the highest court. The roster of cases (Appendix, Part VI.A
and VI.B, infra) shows that there were no duplicated cases in the two
samples. Both samples are small, but this is not unusual for statistical
studies on the use of precedents.136
1. The Hoffman Plastic Database
TRIALS: For the full observation period (2002-2012), did trial courts at
the federal and state level (a) apply Hoffman Plastic, (b) partly apply it,
(c) distinguish it, or (d) not cite it?
TABLE 1.1
How TRIAL COURTS USE HOFFMAN PLASTIC PRECEDENT:
FEDERAL AND STATE OPINIONS (2002-2012)
80%
60% . --- - - .---- - -
40%
20%
Applied Hoffman Plastic Partly Applied Hoffman Distinguished Hoffman Not Cite Hoffman Plastic
Plastic Plastic
0 Federal Courts 0 State Courts
The main finding is that trial courts and administrative tribunals disre-
garded Hoffman Plastic when the case was argued by an employer as a
controlling precedent. The level of disregard was highest in federal dis-
trict courts, where 68.9% of the opinions said that the facts or circum-
stances were distinguishable from Hoffman Plastic. Fifty percent (50%)
of state courts or tribunals, such as workers' compensation boards, distin-
136. See Anthony Niblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents to Justify Extra-Legal De-
cisions?: A Statistical Examination, 70 MD. L. REv. 234, 245 (2010) (using a dataset of
seventy-two reported California Courts of Appeal cases and seven California Supreme
Court cases). Similar to my research, this study asked questions relating to a specific issue
in litigation: "Do judges simply cherry pick precedents to justify an extra-legal decision?"
See id. at 235. Answering no, the study concluded that the research literature overstates the
degree to which judges manipulate precedent and misuse judicial discretion. See id. at 235.
For a study that employed a similar method of using keyword searches to identify cases
that are used for data collection, see Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule,
39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 355-56 (2010).
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guished Hoffman Plastic. In contrast, very few trial courts and tribunals
cited Hoffman Plastic as positive authority-only 13.3% of cases for fed-
eral courts and 25% for state courts and tribunals. Partial support for
Hoffman Plastic was also rare, occurring in 4.4% of federal and 12.5% of
state cases.
Another small group of decisions did not cite Hoffman Plastic at all-
13.3% of federal and 12.5% of state cases. These cases had all the pri-
mary attributes of Hoffman Plastic and were the progeny of previous
cases that cited Hoffman Plastic, where an employer argued for applica-
tion of the Supreme Court precedent. Interpretation of the "not cited"
statistic for Hoffman Plastic is ambiguous because these were situations
where downstream courts could have relied on Hoffman Plastic if so in-
clined. On the other hand, while these indirect cases presented a Hoff-
man Plastic remedy issue, it is possible that no one brought that lead
precedent to the attention of the court. These statistics were included,
even though their interpretation is ambiguous, because the non-citing of a
case may be indicative of a precedent's declining influence.
APPEALS: For the full observation period (2002-2012), did appellate
courts at the federal and state level (a) apply Hoffman Plastic, (b) partly
apply it, (c) distinguish it, or (d) not cite it?
TABLE 1.2







Applied Hoffman Plastic Partly Applied Hoffman Distinguished Hoffman Not Cite Hoffman Plastic
Plastic Plastic
U Federal Courts 'TState Courts
Compared to trial courts, federal appeals courts showed more defer-
ence to Hoffman Plastic, citing it as positive authority in 42.9% of their
cases. State courts did not follow this trend. Only 10.8% of these cases
cited Hoffman Plastic with approval. Meanwhile, a majority of federal
(57.1%) and state (59.5%) appellate courts distinguished Hoffman
Plastic.
TRIALS SHORTLY AFTER Hoffman Plastic (2002-2006) and More Re-
cently (2007-2012): Comparing early cases (decided 2002-2006) and more
recent ones (decided 2007-2012), did trial courts at the federal and state




How TRIAL COURTS USE HOFFMAN PLASTIC:
COMPARING FEDERAL AND STATE TRIAL
OPINIONS (2002-2006 & 2007-2012)
OverTime, Fewer State Courts
Applied Hoffman Plastic While




Applied Hoffman Plastic Partly Applied Hoffman
Plastic
3
Distinguished Hoffman Not Cite Hoffman Plastic
Plastic
N Federal Courts 2002 06 M State Courts 2002-06 WH Federal Courts 2007 12 , State Courts 2007-12
The early period is denoted in solid bars (darker bar shows federal
cases), while more recent cases are shown in hashed bars. Over time, fed-
eral district court approval of Hoffman Plastic rose from 9.5% to 16.7%
(indicated by "1" arrow at left) but this support was consistently weak.
Most federal courts distinguished Hoffman Plastic, and the trend rose
from 66.7% to 70.8% (indicated by "3" arrow, middle-right). State courts
and administrative tribunals were even less supportive for Hoffman
Plastic. Their positive citations fell from 30% to 16.7% (indicated by "2"
arrow, left). Meanwhile, state cases that distinguished Hoffman Plastic
rose from 40% to 66.7% (indicated by "4" arrow, middle-right).
APPEALS SHORTLY AFTER Hoffman Plastic (2002-2006) and More Re-
cently (2007-2012):
Comparing early case (decided 2002-2006) and more recent ones (de-
cided 2007-2012), did appellate courts at the federal and state level use
the Hoffman Plastic precedent more, less, or the same over time?
TABLE 1.4
How STATE APPELLATE COURTS USE HOFFMAN PLASTIC:
COMPARING 2002-2006 AND 2007-2012
From 2002-2006 to 2007-2012, More State
Appeals Courts Applied Hoffman Plastic, But
Support for the Precedent Remained Low
From 2002-2006 to 2007 2012,
Fewer State Appeals Courts
Distinguished Hoffman Plastic,
But More Courts Did Not Cite the
2 Precedent













In 2002-2006, the sample had only one federal appeals case. That case
approvingly cited Hoffman Plastic. But it would be misleading to re-
present a single case as 100% support for Hoffman Plastic. Therefore, no
federal cases are shown in Table 1.4. Parenthetically, in the recent period
(2007-2012) two federal cases approved of Hoffman Plastic (33.3%), and
four distinguished it (66.7%). Table 1.4 shows results for state appellate
cases, with nineteen decisions in the early period and eighteen in the re-
cent group. State appellate court support for Hoffman Plastic was low in
both periods, but increased from 5.3% in 2002-2006 to 16.7% in
2007-2012 (indicated by "1" arrow at left). Most courts distinguished
Hoffman Plastic, with this trend decreasing over time (from 73.7% to
44.4%, indicated by "2" arrow at middle-right). But state appeals courts
that did not cite Hoffman Plastic rose from 15.8% to 38.9% (indicated by
"3" arrow at right).
2. The Supreme Court Database
Passage of Years to Overrule a Precedent: How many years pass before
the Supreme Court overrules its precedents? There were 154 dyads con-
sisting of an earlier case that was overruled by a more recent case. The
range was 1-138 years. On average, a mean of 30.24 years and a median
of 20 years passed before the Court overruled its own precedent.
TABLE 2.1
PASSAGE OF YEARS FOR SUPREME COURT CASES To
OVERRULE A PRECIDENT
9
8 10 Years Since Hoffman Plastic was Decided
7 .. 4 PrecedentsjLasted
...... ~ .... ... 109 -136 Years
5
4 Median of 20 Years Passed Before Supreme
Court Overruled Its Precedent
E3
1I I... tIll 111111 1 IIllII 1I [I-ll II I
Ln f h n r , m In N - s, M~ 'n EN S' mf r' -4 'n CA en r' .4
c4 "l in N n 4 -4 it l~f W 0 P, r W OD CO
Years between Original and Overruling Case
5 Number of Cases
Table 2.1 uses median years for passage of time to overrule a Supreme
Court precedent (see middle arrow) because a mean average tends to be
distorted in a small sample with outliers (see the widely dispersed cases
after fifty years). Twenty-five percent (25%) of cases were overruled in
9.75 years, 50% were overruled in 20 years, and 75% were overruled in
40.25 years. By 2012, ten years had passed since the Supreme Court de-
cided Hoffman Plastic (see left arrow). Time will tell if Hoffman Plastic is
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overruled, but it has survived about as long as 25% of the precedents that
have been overruled.
VOTE MARGIN IN CASES THAT ARE OVERRULED: How many years
pass before the Supreme Court overrules one of its precedents? This
question was expressed as a linear regression model, using this simple
equation: Years Elapsed = 8.663 (Constant) plus 4.436 (Vote Margin). In
other words, the equation predicts that the number of years before the
Court overrules a rejected precedent is 4.436 multiplied by each marginal
vote in the overruled case, plus a constant of 8.663 years.137 Consider a
closely decided precedent that is overruled, with a vote margin of 1 (a
case decided by a 5-4 vote). For this case, the regression predicts that
about thirteen years passes before a precedent is overruled.' 38 Compare
this to a 9-0 precedent that is overruled, where the regression equation
predicts that this type of case takes 47.09 years to overrule.139
CLOSE VOTES
TABLE 2.2
ARE LINKED TO EARLY
OF PRECEDENTS
0
WD OXD O 0 00MD =E 0 0 GD CO (0 0 0 0 0 OO 0
,0 o
so C co ao o0o 0 on 0
aD
=-=C W 0 000 0
a 25 50 75 10 125
YEARPASS
Table 2.2 is a scatterplot that shows each dyad as a dot. Each dot has a
coordinate for the Y-axis (Vote Margin) and X-axis (Years Elapsed).
There are two strong concentrations of dyads, one at the far lower left
137. The t-statistic for Vote Margin is 6.529, with one degree of freedom, resulting in
significance at p < .000.
138. This figure is the sum of the coefficient for each marginal vote in the majority (1
vote multiplied by 4.436, or 4.436) plus the constant (8.663), adding to 13.10 years.
139. For this statistic, the coefficient is 9 votes multiplied by 4.436 (38.43 years), plus the





(Cluster 1), and the other slightly above and to the right (Cluster 2).
These show many one-vote margin dyads that were densely concentrated
between 0 and 25 years, and another concentration of dyads that were
decided by three-vote margins and overturned within 25 years. Cases that
were overruled extraordinarily early, within 1-3 years, include Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,140 overruled by Adarand Construction Inc. v.
Pena;141 Grady v. Corbin,'142 overruled by United States v. Dixon;143 and
Trupiano v. United States,'144 Overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz.145
More precedents were decided by one vote and overruled in 4-9 years.146
There were fewer dyads with two-vote margins. These close cases were
overruled between 0 and 25 years. Just above that line, there were many
cases decided by three votes (Cluster 2). Most were overruled within 25
years. In contrast, the lines that indicate cases decided by 7, 8, or 9 vote
margins do not show a clear cluster or pattern.
TABLE 2.3
PRECEDENTS DECIDED BY ONE VoTE ARE OVERRULED MORE OFTEN
I AA 0 08" a Im n n0no 07
0 25 50 715 100 125
YEARPASS
140. 497 U.S. 547 (1992).
141. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
142. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
143. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
144. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
145. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
146. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obs. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 837 (1992); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971), overruled by Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Durham v. United States,
401 U.S. 481 (1971), overruled by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); Perez v.
Campbell, 369 U.S. 153 (1962), overruled by Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 402 U.S. 637
(1971); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), overruled by Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), overruled by Harris v. United States,
382 U.S. 162 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Mun.
Ctg. Of S. F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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Table 2.3 represents another view of the data. It ranks Vote Margin by
its strength of correlation to Years Elapsed. Cases decided by 1 and 2
votes were clustered in the period between 0 and 25 years (see top two
lines). But the pattern was interrupted by cases decided by 9 votes, which
had a large cluster of dyads with 25 years or less. Table 2.3 shows a more
random scattering of years-elapsed data points for overruled precedents
that were decided by four, five, six, seven, and eight votes. The R-square
value for the regression equation was .218, meaning that Vote Margin
explained 21.8% of the variance in Years Elapsed. Thus, a close vote for a
precedent had a significant connection to a later decision to overrule it,
but the model was limited in its ability to explain why these cases take
between 1 and 138 years to overrule. The fairly low R-square value im-
plies that other variables not tested in this equation could account for
additional variance in years elapsed before a case is overruled (e.g., the
type of issue decided in the overruled precedent, be it constitutional, or
maritime, or other).
IV. HOW DO THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS INTERRELATE?
A. THE STATISTICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE HoFFMAN PLASTIC
AND SUPREME COURT DATABASES
Are the findings from the Hoffman Plastic and Supreme Court
databases connected? The Hoffman Plastic data show that most federal
and state courts disregard this Supreme Court precedent. Most courts
view Hoffman Plastic as an inapplicable precedent. This tendency does
not mean, however, that the Supreme Court is likely to overrule Hoffman
Plastic. As discussed in Part II.B, lower courts can largely disregard a
precedent, and the Supreme Court can respond by implicitly overruling
itself.147 The emerging pattern for Hoffman Plastic is similar, for exam-
ple, to the Supreme Court's opinion in New York v. Belton.148 Dozens of
lower courts minimized the precedential value of Belton by distinguishing
it on state law grounds,149 calling it into doubt,150 citing disagreement
147. See Saucier v. Katz, 583 U.S. 194 (2001).
148. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
149. See State v. Rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 99-101 (N.M. 2008); Holman v. State, 183 P.3d
368, 371 (Wyo. 2008); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 42 (Vt. 2007); State v. Dunlap, 888
A.2d 1278, 1281 (N.J. 2006); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 373-74 (Nev. 2003); State v.
Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 948 (N.J. 1994); State v. Valdez, 152 P.3d 1048, 1051 (Wash. Ct. App.
2007); State v. Carroll, 899 A.2d 998, 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); State v. Eckel,
888 A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. Super. 2006); Commonwealth v. Gelineau, 696 A.2d 188, 195
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Commonwealth v. Knoche, 678 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
150. See State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1023 (Haw. 2011); Hathaway v. State, 906
N.E.2d 941, 944-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Eckel, 863 A.2d 1044, 1047 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2004).
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with it,1st and declining to extend it.152 Compared to Hoffman Plastic,
fewer courts positively cited the Belton precedent. 153 After witnessing
this decline over 28 years, the Supreme Court reconsidered Belton in Ari-
zona v. Gant.154 While the Gant majority opinion acknowledged weak
support for its precedent,155 the opinion stopped short of overruling Bel-
ton in a nuanced footnote.156
This could well be the fate of Hoffman Plastic.'57 On the other hand,
Hoffman Plastic's harsh treatment of unlawful aliens runs against the cur-
rent stream of political values. More tolerant treatment of these individu-
151. See United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1071 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Jones, No. 09-171, 2011 WL 2118708, at *8 (W.D. Pa. 2011); Cotton v. State, 119 P.3d
931, 935 (Wyo. 2005); O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 410 (Wyo. 2005); People v. Torres,
543 N.E. 2d 61, 64 (N.Y. 1989); People v. Luna, 951 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012);
Armstead v. Virginia, 695 S.E.2d 561, 576 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); Bledsoe v. Kentucky, No.
2009-CA-0011-19-MC, 2010 WL 4025901, at *2 (Ky. App. Ct. 2010); State v. Grubb, 930
N.E.2d 380, 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010); Hoskins v. State, 242 P.3d 185, 187 (Idaho App.
2010); State v. Brower, No. 22929, 2009 WL 1496818, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Brown, No. 2008091 9-CA, 2009 WL 3246603, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009); State v.
Williams, 2009 WL 891784, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009); State v. Oyenusi, 903 A.2d 467, 474
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); State v. Pittman, 127 P.3d 1116, 1120 (N.M. Ct. App.
2005); State v. Dunlap, 2004 WL 3354512, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); People v.
Stewart, No. C037193, 2003 WL 751315, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Arredondo,
944 P.2d 276, 284 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Corrado, No. 96-L-104, 1997 WL 799563,
at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); State v. Myers, 695 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Dickey, 684 A.2d 92, 100 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); State v. Sotelo, 546
N.W.2d 887, 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
152. United States v. Powell, 451 F.3d 862, 863 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Cas-
taneda, 438 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir.
1994); United States v. Hall, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1310 (D. Colo. 2009); United States v.
Julius, 577 F. Supp. 2d 588, 596 (D. Conn. 2008); United States v. Torres-Castro, 374 F.
Supp. 2d 994, 1021 (D.N.M. 2005); State v. LaMay, 103 P.3d 448, 451(Idaho 2004); State v.
Robb, 605 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 2000); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1999);
State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1993); People v. Stehman, 753 N.E.2d 1233, 1237
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001); People v. Trejo, 725 N.E.2d 1289, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Penn-
sylvania v. Shiflet, 636 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); State v. Derifield, 467 N.W.2d
297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
153. For Cases that followed Belton with reservations, see United States v. Weaver, 433
F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. McKibben, 928 F. Supp. 1479, 1480
(D.S.D. 1996); State v. Smith, 662 So.2d 725, 726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); and Donaldson
v. State, No. 08-02-00291-CR, 2003 WL 22220364, at *1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003).
154. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
155. Id. at 347 n.8.
156. See id. at 348 n.9 ("Justice Alito's dissenting opinion also accuses us of 'over-
rul[ing]' Belton . . . 'even though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.' Contrary to
that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is precisely the result Gant has
urged." (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
157. A similar idea is expressed by Professor Michael Gerhardt:
If the Justices were to adopt a low level of deference to precedent (for exam-
ple, overruling a precedent merely deemed erroneously reasoned), then they
will have increased the chances that a subsequent Court will take the same
route. Future Justices could rely on past decisions as expressing a theory of
precedent that supports them in overruling precedent based solely on disa-
greement with the underlying reasoning of those precedents. The inevitable
consequence of all this would be chaos, lack of certainty regarding the dura-
bility of a number of individual freedoms, and/or proof positive that constitu-
tional law is nothing more than politics carried on in a different forum.
Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 71.
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als by the Congress may spur the Supreme Court to reconsider this
precedent. In 2013, the Senate passed a major bill to reform immigration
law. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Mod-
ernization Act (S. 744)158 would legitimize the residency and workforce
participation of these aliens by allowing most of them to register for pro-
visional immigration status. 159 Ironically, instead of treating employment
as a crime, the bill would allow aliens to show proof of employment to
adjust their provisional status for permanent residence. 160 The proposed
bill also incorporates the DREAM Act, which legalizes the presence of
young adults who were brought to the United States illegally by alien
parents1 61 and provides a path for citizenship to most unlawful aliens.162
These reforms imply that the Hoffrnan Plastic majority opinion is out-of-
step with reform of immigration laws.
But again, this does not mean that the overruling of Hoffman Plastic is
imminent, inevitable, or even probable. The small size of the Supreme
Court database cautions against jumping to this conclusion. And key to
note, this study suggests that a deposition of downstream cases correlates
with overruling-but it does not prove that adverse lower court rulings
cause the Court to overrule itself. Justices also manage bad precedents by
marginalizing or ignoring them.163 This study shows, however, that when
the Court overrules a precedent, this tends to happen (1) within 20 years
158. See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by the Senate on June 27, 2013).
159. Id. § 2101 (proposing to amend 8 U.S.C. §1255 et seq. by inserting § 245B, "Adjust-
ment of Status of Eligible Entrants before December 31, 2011 to that of Registered Provi-
sional Immigrant").
160. Id. § 2102 (proposing to amend 8 U.S.C. § 1255 et seq. by inserting § 245C, "Ad-
justment of Status of Registered Provisional Immigrants"). By "adjustment of status," this
part of the law refers to a process of elevating provisional immigrants to Lawful Permanent
Residents-a milestone to achieving naturalized citizenship. See id. Practically speaking,
the formerly unlawful alien would need to show that he or she would not become "a public
charge." See id. § 245C(b)(3)(A)(i)(II). Under § 245C(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), applicants would be
required to prove that they were "regularly employed throughout the period of admission
as a registered provisional immigrant, allowing for brief periods lasting not more than 60
days." Id.
161. See id. § 2103 (The DREAM Act) (proposing to amend 8 U.S.C. § 1255 et seq. by
inserting § 245D, "Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens Who Entered the United States
as Children").
162. Id. § 2511 (proposing to rename the Office of Citizenship in U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services as the Office of Citizenship and New Americans. The goal of the new
office would be to "promote institutions and provide training on citizenship responsibilities
for aliens interested in becoming naturalized citizens of the United States." Id.
§ 2511(b)(2).
163. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("De-
spite the variety of reasons that may inform and justify a decision to overrule, we cannot
forget that such a decision is usually perceived . . . as . . . a statement that a prior decision
was wrong. There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior
Courts."). More generally, see Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1140, 1142-43 (1994); Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37
ARIz. L. REV. 1107, 1120, n.75 (1995); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 756-63 (1988); Pintip Hompluem Dunn, Note,
How Judges Overrule: Speech Act Theory and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE L. J.
493, 520-23 (2003) (discussing how the Court implicitly overrules a precedent).
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of the ruling, and (2) in cases that are decided by a one vote margin.
Hoffman Plastic has these two "overruling" traits.
B. THE TEXTUAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE HOFFMAN PLASTIC
AND SUPREME COURT DATABASES
The Court sometimes cites negative treatment of the precedent by
lower courts as a reason to overrule a precedent. This Section considers
the possibility that inferior courts channel adverse rulings upward, as a
result of a derelict clogging the downstream flow of precedent. 164 The
following headings reflect themes that the Court has used when overrul-
ing a precedent. Text and rulings from the Hoffman Plastic database are
presented to show how a future Supreme Court might use these princi-
ples or examples to overrule this derelict.
1. A New Line of Authority May Undermine a Precedent to Such a
Degree that the Court Feels Compelled to Overrule It.
Some Hoffman Plastic cases involved aliens who were seriously injured
or killed.165 Citing Hoffman Plastic, early appellate court rulings in New
York vacated awards for lost earnings in a personal injury lawsuit.166 This
stream of precedent shifted when Jallow v. Kew Gardens Hills Apart-
ments Owners allowed a limited recovery for damages.167 The stream
continued to move in favor of alien workers when an appeals court in
Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC reversed lower court rulings, and held that
undocumented aliens may recover damages.168 Balbuena differentiated
the case of an injured alien from Hoffman Plastic, observing that the
164. See Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic
Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 938 (2013) (stating that an examination of the "cases in
which the Court actually interprets its own plurality decisions suggests that precedent in
this realm actually flows upward-that is, the Supreme Court's plurality decisions signal a
willingness . . . to tolerate lower court experimentation and development as to the critical
questions that divided the Supreme Court."). In a related vein, consider the concept of
"anticipatory overruling," explained by C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent:
The Supreme Court's Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 39, 41 (1990) ("According to this view, lower courts should disregard Supreme Court
decisions when they are reasonably sure that the Supreme Court would overrule them
given the opportunity. This rejection of doubtful precedent by lower courts has been
termed anticipatory overruling."). For examples, see United States v. City of Phila., 644
F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1980); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 441 F.2d 1222, 1224
(5th Cir. 1971); and Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 472-74 (5th Cir. 1971).
165. See, e.g., Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Ave. LLC, No. 06-04-CV-8163 (BSJ), 2008 WL
4386751, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008) (plaintiff, an undocumented alien from Ecua-
dor, suffered permanent injuries after falling on a construction site).
166. Sanango v. 200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp., 788 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 2004);
Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 787 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div. 2004); Barahona v. Trs. of Co-
lumbia Univ. in N.Y., 816 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (ruling that the university, at the
site of a construction injury, was entitled to discover the plaintiff's immigration status).
167. 803 N.Y.S. 2d 18, 18 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (citing Hoffman Plastic and granting an em-
ployer's and property owner's motion to deny an injured alien's loss of past and future
earnings in the United States, but allowing the plaintiff to pursue past and future earnings
he could have earned in his home country).
168. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1257 (N.Y. 2006). Reversing lower
court rulings, the court of appeals held that undocumented aliens may recover damages
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state's labor law had a goal of protecting workers, regardless of alien-
age.169 Hernandez v. 151 Sullivan Tenant Corp. followed this new prece-
dent, when the Court awarded an undocumented worker over $7 million
in past and future damages stemming from his fall of more than fifty feet
from a roof construction site. 170 More recently, this precedential stream
split in New York, as some courts allowed a recovery to an unlawful
alien,171 while others opposed this trend.172 This latest turn implies that
the Supreme Court could cite confusion or inconsistency among lower
courts as a justification for overruling Hoffman Plastic.
2. The Philosophy of Judges Is an Important Influence in Changing
the Course of Precedent.'73
In contrast to the majority opinion in Hoffman Plastic, many courts
viewed a plaintiff's immigration status as irrelevantl 74 or prejudicial.175
They blocked employers from inquiring into the immigration status of
plaintiffs to prevent intimidation,'76 or disallowed this prejudicial evi-
because the state's labor law places unqualified responsibility for safe building practices on
property owners and contractors. Id.
169. The court reasoned that the state labor law "applies to all workers in qualifying
employment situations-regardless of immigration status-and nothing in the relevant
statutes or our decisions negates the universal applicability of this principle." Id.
170. 819 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (App. Div. 2006).
171. A court increased an award of $20 million in damages to an undocumented alien
who suffered a traumatic brain injury from a fall in Angamarca v. New York City Partner-
ship Housing Development Fund, Inc., 927 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div. 2011). Macedo v. J.D.
Posillico, Inc., 891 N.Y.S.2d 46 (App. Div. 2009) ruled that an unlawful alien did not forfeit
a right to recover lost wages resulting from his injury because his employer failed to com-
ply with its employment verification requirement under the law. See also Carroll v. 1156
APF LLC, No. 110725/2008, 2011 WL 4443507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 2011) (denying mo-
tion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for lost wages).
172. For some courts, an alien's eligibility for a recovery depends on whether the
worker tendered false documents. Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers, Inc., 58 A.D.3d
44 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), said that IRCA does not criminalize working without documen-
tation, but the law prohibits tendering of false documents. Id. at 53. New York courts have
not broken completely with Hoffman Plastic. Some have cited it with approval to limit an
unlawful alien's recovery. Maliqi v. 17 East 89th St. Tenants, Inc., 880 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup.
Ct. 2009), involved an injured worker who was subject to deportation proceedings and
allowed the jury to base its measurement of lost earnings on wages that could be earned in
the U.S. Id. at 923. Thus, the jury could consider the likelihood that the plaintiff would be
returned to his native country. Id. at 924.
173. See supra note 77.
174. Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 2003); see also Gabriel v. John-
ston's L.P. Gas Serv., Inc., 947 N.Y.S.2d 716 (App. Div. 2012). Gabriel involved migrant
farm workers who filed a personal injury lawsuit against their employer and others after
they were injured in a propane explosion at their New York labor camp. Id. at 718-19. The
court granted the workers a protective order directing that their depositions be taken by
video conference in Guatemala and Mexico. Id. at 722.
175. See, e.g., Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 230 P.3d 583, 585 (Wash. 2010) (statistics show
that illegal aliens faced a one percent chance of being deported in 2009).
176. Gomez v. F&T Int'l, 842 N.Y.S.2d 298, 308 (Sup. Ct. 2007) explained why the
employer could not use the plaintiff's immigration status to thwart a recovery: "Indeed,
what is really happening under the guise of litigating lost wages is that undocumented
workers are being intimidated with the prospect of being deported and having their fami-
lies and lives torn apart after providing their services for dangerous work." Id.
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dence at trial.'77 Cano v. Mallory Management took a different tone and
approach than Hoffman Plastic when, in the course of denying the em-
ployer's discovery motion, the court said that aliens, "like citizens,...
contribute to our economy, serve in the Armed Forces and pay taxes."' 78
While Hoffman Plastic viewed unlawful aliens as criminals, Cano treated
them as civic-minded taxpayers. Yong Pyo Hong v. Life University, ruling
that the IRCA did not preclude a claim for wrongful termination, said
that evidence of the plaintiff's immigration status would be "highly in-
flammatory" and "prejudicial."' 79 This outlook conflicted with Hoffman
Plastic's sense that Jose Castro's alienage was probative in determining
whether the NLRB could order backpay. Even small turnover on the Su-
preme Court could tilt the philosophical pivot that produced the Hoff-
man Plastic precedent.
3. A Precedent is Overruled When It Contradicts or Ignores the
Original Intent of a Law.
Many cases in this study distinguished Hoffman Plastic because the
statute they applied or interpreted differed from IRCA.180 The trend was
particularly evident in worker compensation cases. In Bollinger Ship-
yards, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that Hoffman Plastic was inap-
posite to an alien's claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.18' Vargas v. Kiewit Louisiana Co. denied
the employer's motion to apply the Hoffman Plastic precedent in a mat-
ter involving the fatal fall of a construction worker.182 The unlawful alien
in Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc.183 worked nearly three years
without pay in exchange for tuition and a place to live, but was
threatened with deportation by his employer after he sued for backpay
and overtime.184 Rejecting the employer's use of Hoffman Plastic to pre-
177. See, e.g., Republic Waste Servs., Ltd. v. Martinez, 335 S.W.3d 401, 409 (Tex. 2011)
(explaining that the "probative value of evidence showing only that the plaintiff is an ille-
gal immigrant, who could possibly be deported, is slight because of the highly speculative
nature of such evidence.").
178, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
179. No. 13226957, 2012 WL 882518, at *3 (Cal. Civ. App. Mar. 15, 2012).
180. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals believed that Hoffman Plastic was "unlikely"
to apply to discrimination cases that arise under Title VII. See Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364
F.3d 1057, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing differences between the National Labor
Relations Act and Title VII.). The court concluded that "the overriding national policy
against discrimination would seem likely to outweigh any bar against the payment of back
wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII cases." Id. at 1069.
181. 604 F.3d 864, 879 (5th Cir. 2010). The court reasoned that "awarding benefits to an
undocumented worker under the LHWCA does not appear to 'unduly trench upon explicit
statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy.' This is because the LHWCA
expressly provides for the award of benefits to nonresident aliens." Id. at 877.
182. Civ. A. H-09-2521, 2012 WL 2952171, at *5 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2012) ("[T]his Court
does not find the same danger of motivating immigration policy violations to be present in
this case, as immigrants will not be motivated to violate IRCA in order to obtain additional
U.S. wages after suffering fatal injuries.").
183. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
184. Id. at 1057.
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clude a monetary remedy under federal and state wage laws, the court
reasoned that "[p]rohibiting plaintiff from bringing this claim under the
FLSA would provide a perverse economic incentive to employers to seek
out and knowingly hire illegal workers, as defendant did here, in direct
contravention of immigration laws."1 as Allowing an alien a recovery
under Kentucky worker's compensation law, Abel Verdon Const. v. Ri-
vera found that the purpose of that law differed from the immigration law
in Hoffman Plastic.'86 An Illinois court used similar reasoning.187 Rodri-
guez v. Integrity Contracting concluded, "While Hoffman contains a
wealth of information regarding immigration policy, its reach does not
include language indicating that a matter of state workers' compensation
coverage, such as this, is preempted by this policy."' 88 In sum, these
worker's compensation and contract cases distinguished Hoffman Plastic
by focusing on the purposes behind these laws. A future Supreme Court,
wishing to revisit to Hoffman Plastic, could examine the main purpose for
enacting the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)-which the majority
failed to do in 2002-and conclude that the precedent should be
overturned.' 89
4. When a Precedent Proves to be Impractical or Harmful in Its
Application, the Court May Overrule It.
This principle was evident in wage and hour cases, where an unlawful
alien sued employers for failing to pay minimum wages and overtime.
Employers urged courts to extend Hoffman Plastic by denying claims for
unpaid wages. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment in Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp.190 Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
185. For a similar case of coercion of an unlawful alien see Amoah v. Mallah Mgt.,
LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (alien's fraudulent use of documents did not
bar recoveries for work-related injuries).
186. 348 S.W.3d 749, 755-56 (Ky. 2011) ("[W]e view a decision to exclude unauthorized
aliens from . . . Chapter 342 as contravening the purpose of the IRCA by providing a
financial incentive for unscrupulous employers to hire unauthorized workers and engage in
unsafe practices, leaving the burden of caring for injured workers and their dependents
to ... the Commonwealth.").
187. Econ. Packing Co. v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 901 N.E.2d 915, 923 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008) ("[E]xcluding undocumented aliens from receiving certain workers' compensa-
tion benefits would relieve employers from providing benefits to such employees, thereby
contravening the purpose of the IRCA by creating a financial incentive for employers to
hire undocumented workers.").
188. 38 So.3d 511, 520 (La. 2010).
189. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Bd., 313 U.S. 177, 182 (1941) ("Congress explic-
itly disclosed its purposes [in the NLRA by] declaring [in §1] the policy which underlies the
Act," and concluded that Congress's "ultimate concern ... was 'to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce .. . by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association."'). In this vein, Congress enacted the NLRA's § 10(c) to allow
the "Board 'to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."'). Id. at 187-88.
190. 432 Fed. App'x 801 (11th Cir. 2011). The appellate court concluded that "Hoffman
Plastic is not 'clearly on point' with Patel," a pre-Hoffman decision by the Eleventh Circuit.
Id. at 802. Patel involved an unlawful alien who was attempting to recover wages for work
already performed, however, the unlawful alien in Hoffman Plastic sought back pay for the
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explained why Hoffman Plastic does not apply when unlawful aliens seek
backpay for labor already performed.191 In another pay case, Pineda v.
Kel- Tech Construction, Inc. said that the employers' argument "fails as a
matter of law as it relies solely on the severe misapplication of the hold-
ing of Hoffman."192 Maflinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp.'93 warned
that misapplication of Hoffman Plastic "would also compel the conclu-
sion that any sort of employment-related payment to an undocumented
alien violates federal immigration policy."1 94 Majlinger cautioned that
employers of undocumented aliens "would be free to ignore New York
law governing workplace safety, labor relations, and the furnishing of
workers' compensation coverage, to retaliate against workers who as-
serted any of their rights by reporting them to federal immigration au-
thorities . . . and, indeed, to withhold wages from employees altogether,
with impunity."195
In sum, these examples show that Hoffman Plastic's elevation of immi-
gration law over the NLRA is problematic in other situations. Most lower
courts are unwilling to allow employers to pay unlawful aliens under min-
imum wage, or avoid liability for injuries-and have therefore granted
backpay or worker's compensation, regardless of immigration status.
V. CONCLUSION
This study presents statistical evidence that Hoffman Plastic is a good
candidate for overruling by the Supreme Court. In other words, the pre-
cedent appears to be a derelict in the stream of the law that could pro-
duce a cut-off-a new precedential stream. A derelict can begin with a
closely decided Supreme Court ruling.196 Hoffman Plastic easily meets
this threshold with its 5-4 ruling. While a close vote hardly means that a
precedent will be overruled, the evidence shows that this type of case is
more likely than others to be overruled. 197
My theory also posits that a precedent can be overruled when there is
an accumulating deposit of adverse rulings from lower court downstream
from the lead case.198 This study presents an empirical picture of this dep-
osition process for Hoffman Plastic. In the first ten years that Hoffman
Plastic has been a precedent, KeyCite classified 64 cases as negative au-
lost opportunity to continue to be employed. Id. (discussing Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846
F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988)). The Galdames court "reiterate[d] that illegal aliens are 'employ-
ees' covered by the FLSA." Id. at 804.
191. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005) (explaining that the plaintiffs were seeking un-
paid wages for work already performed, unlike the plaintiffs in Hoffman Plastic). Also, the
statutory text of the FLSA does not qualify that minimum wages and overtime are re-
quired only for authorized workers. See id. at 321-23.
192. 832 N.Y.S.2d 386, 394 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
193. 802 N.Y.S. 2d 56, 62-65 (App. Div. 2005).
194. Id. at 63.
195. Id. at 64.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
197. See supra Table 2.2.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 73-94.
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thority by declining to extend this precedent, 199 distinguishing it,200 limit-
199. Listed in reverse chronological order. Grocers Supply, Inc. v. Cabello, 390 S.W.3d
707, 721 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012); Galdames v. N&D Inv. Corp., 432 Fed. App'x 801, 801
(11th Cir. 2011); Jin-Ming Lin v. Chinatown Rest. Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 185, 186-90 (D.
Mass. 2011); Rodriguez v. Integrity Contracting, 38 So. 3d 511, 519-20 (La. 2010); Amoah
v. Mallah Mgmt., LLC, 866 N.Y.S. 2d 7907, 798-801 (App. Div. 2008); Agri Processor Co.,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 514 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Incalza v. Fendi N. Am., Inc., 479 F.3d
1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007); Pineda v. Kal-Tech Constr., Inc. 832 N.Y.S 2d 386, 394 (Sup. Ct.
2007); Chellen v. John Pickle Co., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2006);
Chellen v. John Pickle Co., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1098 (N.D. Okla. 2006); Galaviz-
Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501 (W.D. Mich. 2005); Majlinger v. Cassino
Contracting Corp., 802 N.Y.S. 2d 56, 64-67, 69 (App. Div. 2005); Rosa v. Partners in Pro-
gress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 997 (N.H. 2005); de Jesus Uribe v. Aviles, No. 10 Civ. 4792
(RLE), 2004 WL 2385135, at *4 (Cal. 2004); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1062
(9th Cir. 2004); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003);
Cano v. Mallory Mgmt., 760 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Singh v. Jutl & C.D. & E's Oil, Inc. 214 F. Supp. 2d,
1056, 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
200. Listed in reverse chronological order. Angamarca v. Da Ciro, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
4792 (RLE), 2012 WL 5077480, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Vargas v. Kiewitt Laico., Civ. A. No.
H-09-2521, 2012 WL 2952171, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2012); Solis v. Cindy's Total Care,
Inc., 2011 WL 6013844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Abel Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.2d
749, 755 (Ky. 2011); Ulin v. ALAEA-72, Inc., No. C-09-2160-EDL, 2011 WL 723617, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); Asylum Co. v. D.C. Dep't of Emp. Servs., 10 A.3d 619, 631-34
(D.C. 2010); Ulin v. Lovell's Antique Gallery, No. C-09-0310 EDL, 2010 WL 3768012, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010); Teamsters Local 763 v. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 156
Wash. App. 1042, 1042 (Wash. 2010); Widjaja v. Kang Yue USA Corp., No. 09CV2089
(RRM), 2010 WL 2132068, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010); Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. v. Dir.
Office of Worker's Comp. Programs, 604 F.3d 864, 877-79 (5th Cir. 2010); Galdames v. N
& D Inv. Corp., No. 08-20472-CIV, 2010 WL 1330000, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Villareal v. El
Chile, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 207, 213 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Sandoval v. Rizzuti Farms, Ltd., No. CV-
07-3076-EFS, 2009 WL 2058145 at *1 (E.D. Wash. 2009); Iweala v. Operational Techs.
Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2009); N.L.R.B. v. C & C Roofing Supply, Inc.,
569 F.3d 1096,1099 (9th Cir. 2009); David v. Signal Intern., LLC, 257 F.R.D. 114,119 (E.D.
La. 2009); Montoya v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (D. Md.
2008); Econ. Packing Co. v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 901 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008); Garcia v. Dicterow, No. G039824, 2008 WL 5050358, at *7 (2008); Yu G. Ke v.
Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v.
Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2008); Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,
558 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2009); King v. ZirMed, Inc., No. 3:05CV-181-14, 2007 WL
3306100, at *5 (W.D. Ky. 2007); Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 70 (2007);
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006); Sunrise Senior
Living, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 183 Fed. App'x 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2006); Balbuena v. IDR Realty
LLC, 812 N.Y.S.2d 416, 420 (N.Y. 2006); Farmers Bros. Coffee v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 23, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 321 (D.N.J. 2005); Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 882 A.2d 817, 820 (Md.
2005); Minerva Avalos v. Atlas World Grp., Inc., No. 2:03CV174, 2005 WL 6736327, at *2
(S.D. Miss. April. 4, 2005); Cabrera v. Ekema, 695 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Mich. 2005); Chopra v.
U.S. Prof'ls, LLC, W2004-01139-COA-R3 CV, 2005 WL 280346, at *2-4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Feb. 2, 2005); Garcia v. Pasquareto, 812 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004); Gomez v.
Falco, 792 N.Y.S.2d 769, 769 (App. Term 2004); Pontes v. New England Power Co., No.
0300160A 2004 WL 2075458, at *2 (Mass. Supp. Aug. 19, 2004); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guz-
man, 116 S.W.3d 234, 243 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003); United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258
F. Supp. 2d 809, 818 (E.D. Tenn. 2003); Martinez v. Mecca Farms, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 601, 604
(S.D. Fla. 2002); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Intern., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191,192 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM (SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002).
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ing its holding, 201 and deciding a matter on state law grounds. 202 Some of
the remaining 154 cases in Hoffman Plastic's KeyCite involved the
NLRB, where lower courts adhered to the precedent.203 But other "posi-
tive" cases had nothing to do with the remedy issue in Hoffman Plastic,2 0 4
meaning that these positive indications give a misleading impression of
support. Hoffman Plastic compares to New York v. Belton,205 implicitly
overruled by Arizona v. Gant,2 0 6 and to Booth v. Maryland,207 expressly
overruled by Payne v. Tennessee.208
Federal circuit court opinions also provide clues that Hoffman Plastic is
a derelict in the stream of the law. The Second,209 Fifth,210 Ninth,211 Elev-
201. Abel Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Ky. 2010); Avila-Blum v.
Casa de Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
202. Zaldivar v. Rodriguez, 819 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. 2012); Madeira v. Affordable
Hous. Found., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
203. N.L.R.B. v. Domsey Trading Corp., 636 F.3d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 2011); San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United Food &
Commercial Workers Union Local 204 v. N.L.R.B., 506 F.3d 1078, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
N.L.R.B. v. Velocity Exp., Inc., 434 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006).
204. KeyCite's positive citations of Hoffman Plastic included the far-removed situation
of the NFL lockout in Brady v. National Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1010 (D.
Minn. 2011). More generally, Hoffman Plastic was cited for the idea that the federal gov-
ernment has authority to set immigration policy-an unremarkable proposition apart from
the issue of monetary relied to an unlawful alien. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980
(2011); United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1296 (N.D. Ala. 2011); Hispanic
Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-2484-568, 2011 WL 5516953, at *4 (N.D.
Ala. 2011).
205. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
206. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
207. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
208. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
209. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]e hold
that IRCA does not preempt . . . a compensatory damages award to an undocumented
worker for personal injury under New York Labor Law § 240(1). . . . Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB . . . does not dictate a different result .... ).
210. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Progr., 604 F.3d 864,
879 (5th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing Hoffman Plastic by reasoning that "awarding benefits to
an undocumented worker under the LHWCA does not appear to unduly trench upon ex-
plicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy" (internal quotation
marks omitted).
211. In two cases, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend Hoffman Plastic. See Rivera v.
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) ("We seriously doubt that Hoffman is as
broadly applicable as NIBCO contends, and specifically believe it unlikely that it applies in
Title VII cases."); Incalza v. Fendi N. Am., Inc., 479 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Hoff-
man did not consider the question whether employees who are able to resolve their work
authorization problems within a short time may be suspended or granted leave without pay
for the interim period."). N.L.R.B. v. C & C Roofing Supply, Inc., 569 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
2009) distinguished Hoffman Plastic. There, the court stated, "Our decision ... does not
order any party to violate federal or state immigration laws. Rather, the effect of our hold-
ing is to place the burden on C & C to provide proper proof ... of the unauthorized status
of those individuals it claims are unauthorized aliens, and to rehire the others." Id. at 1099.
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enth,212 and D.C.2 1 3 circuits have declined to extend or distinguished this
precedent. Hoffman Plastic has been applied with approval in only one
appellate case, involving a union organizing campaign similar to the one
in that precedent.214 Moreover, in cases that were decided after data col-
lection for this study ended in December 2012, the trend continued for
judicial disregard for Hoffman Plastic.215
Statistical evidence in this study bolsters these KeyCite comparisons.
The fact that lower courts seriously question Hoffman Plastic as a prece-
dent is underlined by the finding that among federal district courts, 68.9%
of the cases said that their facts or legal circumstances were distinguisha-
ble from Hoffman Plastic,216 and only 13.3% of federal opinions and 25%
of state opinions cited Hoffman Plastic as positive authority.217
The possibility that Hoffman Plastic will be overruled is further
strengthened by the time-analysis of Supreme Court precedents that are
overruled. Compared to these cases, Hoffman Plastic is still early in the
timeline. This study shows that among these cases, an overruled prece-
dent lasts, on average, 19.5 years.218 In decisions that the Supreme Court
overrules, the regression equation in this study predicts that cases decided
by one vote last 13.1 years. 219 Hoffman Plastic was decided only 11 years
ago. The broad effort to reform immigration law, with proposals to legiti-
mize the employment of currently unlawful aliens, may further erode ju-
dicial support for Hoffman Plastic.
All of these elements seem to work against the vitality of Hoffman
Plastic as a precedent. However, there is no inevitability that Hoffman
212. Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013)
("Hoffman does not give us cause to reconsider whether the IRCA was intended to amend
the FLSA by implication, removing undocumented aliens from its protection."); Galdames
v. N&D Inv. Corp., 432 Fed. App'x 801, 804 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Based on these distinctions,
Hoffman Plastic did not clearly overrule Patel. Accordingly, we reiterate that illegal aliens
are 'employees' covered by the FLSA.").
213. Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 514 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Agri Proces-
sor suggests that if neither Hoffman Plastic nor IRCA requires the result it seeks, we
should still rule in its favor in light of the recent policy changes and debate over the burden
of illegal immigration in this country. . . . [T]he company must make this argument to
Congress, not this court.").
214. N.L.R.B. v. Domsey Trading Corp., 636 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[T]he Board
abused its discretion by failing to remand the case to the ALJ for further proceedings
consistent with Hoffman.").
215. Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 2013)
("Hoffman does not give us cause to reconsider whether the IRCA was intended to amend
the FLSA by implication, removing undocumented aliens from its protection."); Zaldivar
v. Rodriguez, 819 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. 2012) ("[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court re-
jected the reasoning of Hoffman"); Solis v. SCA Restaurant Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 380,
401 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he Court finds the overwhelming weight of authority persuasive
and holds that Hoffman does not preclude an award of backpay to undocumented work-
ers."); Grocers Supply, Inc. v. Cabello, 390 S.W.3d 707, 721 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no
pet.) ("Most courts examining the decision in Hoffman-including Texas courts addressing
the issue of preemption-have given it a narrower reading than Grocers urges.").
216. See supra Table 1.1.
217. See supra Table 1.1.
218. See supra Table 2.1.
219. Supra note 138.
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Plastic will be overruled. Indeed, the precedent may survive only because
the NLRB itself has recently been diminished by intense controversy sur-
rounding hundreds of cases decided by board members who had recess
appointments. 220 If broad immigration reform occurs soon, would the
NLRB be able to reassert itself to the point of ordering backpay for a
''provisional" alien who is working under the employment provisions of
S.744, and who is fired, like Jose Castro, for supporting a union? Such a
scenario might be necessary to present the Supreme Court with an oppor-
tunity to revisit Hoffman Plastic.
Only time can tell whether Hoffman Plastic is a derelict in the stream
of the law. Regardless, the metaphor will likely be used again by Justices.
Like the Army Corps of Engineers, Justices are in a position to watch the
current of precedent rush and swirl by; and if they conclude that a dere-
lict is an obstruction, they can complete the process of changing the
river's course by overruling the precedent. There is nothing novel or ab-
surd about the use of natural metaphors to explain how the law changes.
Indeed, Justices sometimes think in terms of water and flow when they
overrule a precedent. 221 When Justice Douglas-an outdoorsman,222 and
a Justice for almost 36 years-described Federal Baseball Club as a dere-
lict in the stream of law, he made an intellectual connection between two
forces in his vast experience: nature and precedent. The river analogy that
is modeled here shows promise for explaining whether a precedent is a
derelict, and if so, how long the derelict can be expected to continue
before it is overruled. Hopefully, a richer model can go beyond this ap-
proach by analyzing more variables associated with the overruling of
precedents. In time, it may be possible to predict the likelihood that a
precedent will be overruled, much like scientific models estimate the
probability of natural cataclysms.
220. In the 2013-14 term, the Supreme Court will consider whether recess appointees
to the Board had legal authority to rule on cases. See Noel Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d
490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that the recess appointments of members Sharon Block and
Richard Griffin were unconstitutional and invalid), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
221. A prime example appears in United States v. Rabinowitz, 379 U.S. 56, 86 (1950),
overruling Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), where Justice Frankfurter's dis-
senting opinion used this riparian imagery:
In overruling Trupiano we overrule the underlying principle of a whole series
of recent cases (citations omitted), based on the earlier cases. For these cases
ought not to be allowed to remain as derelicts on the stream of the law, if we
overrule Trupiano. These are not outmoded decisions eroded by time. Even
under normal circumstances, the Court ought not to overrule such a series of
decisions where no mischief flowing from them has been made manifest.
339 U.S. at 85-86.
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